Habr•September 7, 2026•🇷🇺Translated from Russian

Microsoft Copilot Can Surface Overshared Data Despite Permission Boundaries

Microsoft Copilot respects existing user permissions when retrieving data from Microsoft 365 services, yet the feature can still expose more information than administrators expect because of permissive default sharing settings.

According to official Microsoft pages, the assistant only accesses content the signed-in user is already authorized to view. The documentation explicitly states that operating inside the Microsoft 365 boundary does not grant tenant-wide visibility and that the semantic index honors identity-based access boundaries.

However, the same guidance notes that SharePoint sets sharing settings to the most permissive option by default. This combination means Copilot will faithfully surface documents, emails, and Teams conversations that were once shared broadly and then forgotten.

Microsoft refers to this scenario as accidental oversharing and recommends adjusting SharePoint and OneDrive sharing settings before enabling the assistant. Administrators are advised to run the Content Management Assessment tool to identify potentially overshared content and to review Data access governance reports, particularly the “Everyone except external users” report that lists the top 100 sites shared organization-wide in the past 28 days.

Two controls help limit exposure. Restricted Access Control uses groups to block all access to a site, including previously granted permissions. Restricted Content Discovery prevents content from appearing in Copilot responses and organization-wide search while leaving existing permissions unchanged, making it easier to obtain approval from data owners.

When data is protected by Microsoft Purview sensitivity labels or Information Rights Management, Copilot honors the granted usage rights. Encryption settings can also exclude programmatic access, thereby limiting what agents can read, although Microsoft documentation stops short of promising complete blocking of file access.

Every Copilot interaction stores the user prompt, the generated response, and citations to source documents. These records can be reviewed through Content search or Microsoft Purview, turning potential oversharing risks into concrete lists of accessed files.

Related articles

Habr•AI Security

AI Agent Workflow Exceeds 100-Unit ERP Limit Reaching 120 Due to Check-Then-Act Race Condition

A detailed case study demonstrates how an AI workflow authorized to order no more than 100 units of COMP-17 ended up creating 120 units across three suppliers. Each individual order of 40 units passed authorization checks returning ALLOW, yet the cumulative result violated the human-delegated mandate. The root cause was a classic check-then-act race condition where stateful permission tracking read the same initial balance concurrently before any updates occurred. Sequential stateful checks prevented the overrun, but concurrent execution allowed all three requests to read zero consumption and receive ALLOW. An improved design using PostgreSQL SELECT FOR UPDATE performs atomic reservation of the grant balance before calling the ERP system, ensuring only two orders succeed and the third is rejected with DENY_CAPACITY. The experiment used a deterministic planner without any LLM to isolate the authorization mechanism from model reasoning quality. Five key questions are provided for production deployments involving cumulative business limits delegated to agents.

AntiMalware•AI Security

SECURITM Launches MCP Server for External AI Access to Security Data

SECURITM has introduced an MCP server that connects external AI assistants directly to its platform data on assets, risks, tasks, and metrics. This marks the first such implementation among Russian SGRC and SOAR systems. The open MCP protocol enables natural language queries about critical assets without owners, overdue tasks, or monthly metric changes without manual data export. Supported tools include GigaChat, Yandex solutions, Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor, and compatible local models. Access remains strictly read-only through dedicated tokens with optional IP restrictions. The feature is available in paid cloud and on-premise editions and complements the platform’s built-in AI assistant.

Habr•AI Security

One Year Left to Secure Systems as Open-Source GLM-5.3-Flash Enables Automated Cyber Attacks

Chinese company Z.ai Co. released GLM-5.3-Flash in August 2026, an open-weight model that achieves 84.5% on CyberGym and 54.4% on ExploitBench, matching or exceeding leading commercial LLMs in vulnerability discovery and exploitation tasks. The model runs locally on consumer hardware such as a single Nvidia DGX Spark or Apple M5 Mac Studio with 256 GB unified memory, allowing unrestricted use after abliterated versions remove safety alignments. Experts warn that LLM agents could soon scan and exploit zero-days across Windows, Linux, browsers, and messaging apps around the clock. Initiatives Project Glasswing (Anthropic-led) and Daybreak (OpenAI-led) are racing to patch critical vulnerabilities in open-source projects and critical infrastructure before the next generation of unrestricted models arrives. Organizations are advised to accelerate patch deployment, inventory supply chains, and adopt advanced LLMs defensively within the remaining one-year window.

Habr•AI Security

RFC 9421 and Open wbauth Protocol Accelerate AI Agents 5.5x by Replacing Anti-Detect Browsers with Cryptographic Signatures

A new open implementation of the IETF RFC 9421 HTTP Message Signatures standard called wbauth allows AI agents to authenticate using Ed25519 cryptographic signatures instead of resource-heavy anti-detect browser farms. The approach eliminates the need for Camoufox, Playwright, or AdsPower instances that consume 500 MB to 1.5 GB of RAM per process and require residential proxy pools. Benchmarks show cold start time dropping from 1744 ms to 5 ms, request time from 86.8 ms to 15.8 ms, and memory usage from 500 MB to 0.76 MB. The system uses three HTTP headers for signing and verification against a public key directory hosted on Cloudflare Workers and D1. Server-side validation at the WAF or edge involves fetching the public key, canonicalizing the message per RFC 9421, verifying the Ed25519 signature, and checking timestamps to prevent replay attacks. The npm package wb-auth@0.4.0 and PyPI package wbauth-sdk==0.4.0 provide ready-to-use signers for Node, Bun, Deno, Python httpx, and requests. The full source is available on GitHub under the MrKoriy/wbauth repository.