Russian Voice Traffic Surges 25-30% as Mobile Internet Usage Falls for First Time
In the first half of 2026, the volume of voice traffic in Russian mobile networks increased by 25-30 percent, while consumption of mobile internet declined by 10-12 percent for the first time.
Users have begun returning to traditional phone calls as the primary means of communication. At the same time, home broadband traffic grew by approximately 18-20 percent, according to reports from Izvestia.
Analysts cite two main drivers: restrictions on mobile internet access and difficulties reaching foreign messengers. As a result, everyday conversations are moving back to voice services, while bandwidth-intensive activities such as video streaming, AI tools, and other heavy services are being offloaded to home or office Wi-Fi networks.
Fixed-line networks are also experiencing extra demand from the growing number of IoT devices, including video surveillance cameras, sensors, and smart watches.
In May, traffic generated by AI bots exceeded the volume of data created by human users for the first time. Projections for the full year 2026 indicate a further 5-10 percent decline in mobile internet traffic, a 15-20 percent increase in wired broadband, and a 10-15 percent rise in telephone call volumes.
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