Hydrat Project Builds Automated WireGuard Gateway for Resilient VLESS and Tor Routing
A developer has introduced Hydrat, an automated WireGuard gateway designed to maintain connectivity when VLESS servers become blocked or degraded. The project allows users to keep a single WireGuard profile on phones, laptops, and routers while the server handles proxy selection and failover.
The gateway accepts VLESS links, subscription feeds, and Tor bridges through an admin panel. Candidates undergo preliminary and full testing that checks access to Cloudflare, YouTube, ChatGPT, OpenAI API, and Telegram services, including UDP performance. Up to 10,000 candidates can be stored, with a working pool limited to 200 high-quality routes.
Active monitoring detects outages through fast HTTP and DNS probes, while a separate QoE loop measures time-to-first-byte and throughput against historical baselines. Routes enter degradation status after three poor results out of five and recover only after four good measurements. Two confirmed failures within a 20-measurement window also trigger alerts.
Client assignment uses weighted rendezvous hashing for initial selection. Planned route changes require a sustained 30 percent advantage, at least 30 minutes on the current path, and confirmation across three checks. Failover prefers pre-assigned backups before scanning the pool, and transport-level blocking occurs only when no viable alternative remains.
Network changes are applied sequentially: a new Xray outbound is created first, nftables rules are updated next, and old exits are removed last to avoid transient client disconnection. Separate counters ensure that only newer test results update route state.
The service runs in Docker, supports obfs4 and webtunnel Tor bridges, and preserves the last applied routing plan across restarts. The author notes that the server must remain reachable via WireGuard and therefore recommends placement within Russian jurisdiction.
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