Engineer Tackles Jane Street ASIC Reverse Engineering Puzzle with Custom Simulator and Verilog Extraction
An experienced engineer has published a comprehensive write-up detailing the months-long effort required to solve Jane Street’s “Can you reverse engineer an ASIC?” puzzle. The challenge supplied a GDS file describing the physical layout of a custom ASIC along with a VCD simulation trace, tasking participants with recovering the device’s intended function and any hidden message.
Instead of relying on existing EDA tools, the author constructed a complete custom toolchain. After extracting cell names prefixed with sky130_fd_sc_hd__ using the gdstk library, a graph-based connectivity algorithm was implemented to merge overlapping polygons across layers and produce a netlist. This netlist was then emitted as Verilog, enabling functional simulation that ultimately revealed two shift registers, an adder, and a comparator checking for the value 496.
The main puzzle proved substantially larger, containing almost 10,000 instances of 81 distinct standard cells. Performance optimizations reduced netlist extraction time from minutes to under a second per iteration, yet the author still encountered an un-driven net connected only to two input pins—an anomaly reported back to Jane Street as a possible layout bug.
Throughout the project the engineer also created supporting utilities: an SQLite-backed logic simulator, a simple hardware description language with its parser, a test harness, and a raylib-based GDS viewer. Although these side tools were eventually abandoned in favor of Surfer Waveform Viewer, they illustrate the depth of custom infrastructure required when standard reverse-engineering flows are unavailable.
The final simulation confirmed that a specific input sequence produces the expected output, completing the warmup stage and demonstrating a viable path for the full challenge despite the author’s self-imposed rule of avoiding established commercial EDA suites.
Related articles
EtherHiding Campaign Hides Banking Trojan C2 in Polygon Smart Contracts
Security researchers have detailed the EtherHiding campaign, which conceals command-and-control infrastructure inside smart contracts on the Polygon blockchain. The final payload is a malicious browser extension that functions as a banking trojan, intercepting credentials and two-factor codes from approximately 479 financial and cryptocurrency websites. Instead of embedding fixed addresses in its code, the malware queries an encrypted C2 server address from the smart contract, allowing operators to change destinations through low-cost blockchain transactions that bypass domain blocking. Infection begins when victims visit one of 31 compromised legitimate sites that inject JavaScript displaying a fake CAPTCHA prompt. The prompt instructs users to press Windows+R and execute a PowerShell command, a social engineering technique known as ClickFix that downloads the malicious scripts without exploiting any software vulnerability. The campaign has remained active from November 2025 through at least September 2026, demonstrating the resilience of blockchain-based infrastructure against traditional takedown methods.
Group-IB Uncovers HEAVYGRAM Multi-Stage Windows Spyware Controlled via Telegram Bot API
Researchers at Group-IB have identified 29 new samples of HEAVYGRAM, a sophisticated multi-stage Windows malware designed to target journalists, Iranian dissidents, and government critics. The campaign begins with social engineering lures that deliver archives containing fake Telegram, KeePass, or video editor files, along with WSF, HTA, and Persian-language screensaver payloads. Once executed, the malware uses PowerShell to fetch additional components, establishes persistence through Windows startup mechanisms, and adds its directories to Microsoft Defender exclusions. The core implant, written in Python and packed with PyInstaller, supports DLL side-loading and communicates exclusively through Telegram Bot API to receive commands, capture screenshots, enumerate processes, and exfiltrate data. A particularly damaging capability allows theft of Telegram Desktop session files, enabling account hijacking without password re-entry. Group-IB attributes the operation to the Handala Hack group, linked to the Void Manticore persona also tracked as Storm-0842 and Red Sandstorm, believed to operate on behalf of Iranian intelligence services.
Kaspersky Details MovieReaper Malware Framework Distributed via Compromised Torrent Trackers
Kaspersky researchers have uncovered MovieReaper, a previously unknown modular malware framework that spreads through popular torrent sites by masquerading as movies, games, and other content. The campaign began after attackers compromised the itorrents repository in October 2025, allowing malicious torrents to propagate across multiple trackers and infect hundreds of users across Europe, Asia, and Africa. MovieReaper uses a multi-stage infection chain that includes a fake executable with a VLC icon, shellcode delivery from an initial C2, and a secondary C2 address retrieved from the Solana blockchain to improve resilience against takedowns. Subsequent stages bypass Windows UAC for persistence before deploying a final module with 21 commands for file system access, exfiltration, and potential additional payload deployment. The same report also covers NightEagle attacks on Russian infrastructure and the PAYLOAD extortion campaign using Active Directory Group Policy. Separate research highlights new side-channel attacks such as InjectEave on headphones and DDRop against Intel TDX and AMD SEV-SNP protections, along with a zero-day in Google Pixel radio modules and the arrest of TeamPCP members facilitated by Google Threat Intelligence Group.
MacSync Malware Evolves to Steal Cryptocurrency and Conceal Components in iCloud
Updated MacSync malware for macOS now arrives bundled with a stealer and backdoor, allowing attackers to harvest browser history, cookies, passwords, Telegram data, and cryptocurrency wallet details while maintaining persistent remote access. Discovered by Kaspersky researchers in September 2026, the new variant uses a multi-stage infection chain that begins with a fake application download, such as a document collaboration tool or crypto wallet. One component is delivered through a publicly shared iCloud calendar entry in ICS format, bypassing traditional loaders. After execution, MacSync requests administrator credentials, displays a fake macOS damage notification, and installs the stealer alongside a Finder-masquerading backdoor. The backdoor enables arbitrary code execution, file theft, browser extension installation, and replacement of the legitimate Ledger application with a malicious version to drain cryptocurrency funds. Users are advised to download software only from trusted sources and remain cautious of unexpected administrator password prompts.