Solar and F6 Integrate Solar webProxy with F6 Malware Detonation Platform to Filter Web Threats
GC Solar and F6 have confirmed the integration of the Solar webProxy web access management system with the F6 Malware Detonation Platform. The joint solution enables faster detection of unknown threats by preventing the sandbox from being overloaded with safe web objects such as fonts, icons, and other routine content.
Solar webProxy performs preliminary filtering of objects arriving through web channels. Suspicious files are then forwarded over the ICAP protocol to F6 Malware Detonation Platform, where they undergo reputation analysis, static rule checks, and, when required, execution inside an isolated virtual machine to observe behavioral indicators.
Administrators can adjust the sensitivity of the integration. They may choose to send a larger volume of files to the sandbox or apply stricter pre-filtering so that only high-risk objects reach the detonation environment. The second approach conserves compute resources and shortens the queue for genuinely dangerous samples.
The problem addressed by the integration is practical rather than theoretical. According to the Solar webProxy team, archives represented 37 percent of web threats on average in 2025. Malicious payloads are commonly concealed inside ZIP, RAR, and 7Z containers, disguised as documents, installers, or other legitimate-looking files.
F6 Malware Detonation Platform can forcibly open and analyze files and links inside a virtual environment, identifying stealers, keyloggers, ransomware, and other malware families. Solar webProxy controls web traffic and decides which objects merit submission to this controlled analysis environment.
The integration is aimed primarily at medium and large organizations in the financial sector, industrial enterprises, and government agencies that process substantial volumes of data through web gateways every day.
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