Security NEXT•September 27, 2026•🇯🇵Translated from Japanese

Findy to Host AI×Security Conference 2026 on Rapid AI Evolution and Core Defense Principles

Findy will hold the offline-only AI×Security Conference 2026 on October 28, 2026, at KABUTO ONE Hall & Conference in Tokyo under the theme “AI-driven changes in governance, defense, and operations.”

The conference responds to AI’s unexpectedly rapid progress since 2026, which has produced large volumes of vulnerability reports and introduced new risks such as over-privileged AI agents and shadow AI. Organizations now face the practical challenge of maintaining control and security while these technologies continue to evolve.

Keynote speakers include Ikotas Labs CEO Tsuji Tomoki, known for successes in the Japanese Ministry of Defense contest, DEF CON CTF, and a Pwn2Own win against OpenAI Codex. He will address overlooked threat areas, proactive software issues, and how to rebuild monitoring and operations using the latest overseas examples.

GitHub’s Fredrik Skogman will cover supply-chain concerns, focusing on package authenticity, secure software delivery, and emerging AI-related attacks targeting development environments.

EG Secure Solutions CTO Hiroaki Tokumaru will emphasize that the fundamental structure of attacks has not changed despite AI-driven automation, and will outline the defense principles organizations should still prioritize. Cabinet Office National Cyber Director Mikiharu Shimizu is also scheduled to speak.

Additional sessions include a special lecture by GMO Flatt Security Co-CTO Takashi Yonai and practitioner talks from Mitsubishi UFJ Bank, JR East Japan Information Systems, and Mercari. The two-track program is free to attend but requires advance registration on the official event page.

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