Habr•October 2, 2026•🇷🇺Translated from Russian

Vendor Responsibility in Open Source: Licensing Obligations Exposed by Sonatype Nexus Changes

The original open source project continues to receive updates on GitHub under EPL 1.0, yet ready binary distributions have ceased. Vendors who previously layered their enhancements on top of official Sonatype builds must now compile from source and maintain their own fork.

CodeScoring analysts note that this situation is not unique to Nexus Repository. Any product built on a copyleft-licensed component carries the same duties: disclose changes to the original code, clearly separate proprietary modules from modified upstream files, and accept full commercial liability because the original authors disclaim all warranties.

Under EPL 1.0, weak copyleft applies only to modified files. Vendors may distribute the combined binary under a single commercial license provided they identify the EPL-covered portions, supply access instructions for corresponding source code, and ensure that their own additions are not derivative works of the upstream project.

Security consequences are direct. Sonatype has historically addressed critical vulnerabilities in Nexus Repository within days of disclosure. Once a vendor maintains a divergent fork, the time between upstream advisory and patched customer release becomes a measurable supply-chain metric. A one-year lag in the base version already signals missing or manual patch processes.

The recommended buyer checklist includes confirming the exact upstream version in use, locating published modifications required by the license, verifying an SBOM for the final product, and obtaining documented vulnerability response timelines. Answers such as “intellectual property” to source disclosure requests contradict the license terms under which the vendor received the code.

Related articles

BoletimSec•Supply Chain & Open Source

GhostAction Campaign Compromises 790 GitHub Repositories via Malicious Workflows

Researchers from OpenSourceMalware have identified 790 publicly accessible GitHub repositories containing malicious workflows planted by the GhostAction campaign as of October 9. The campaign abuses trusted maintainer accounts to inject workflows that automatically exfiltrate secrets including AWS access keys and tokens for GitHub, GitLab, Google, Slack, SendGrid, OpenAI, Anthropic, and OpenRouter. Earlier counts by GitGuardian recorded 772 repositories between August 31 and September 30, though the datasets differ and are not cumulative. A separate wave on October 8 impacted 346 repositories linked to two maintainer accounts, including a project belonging to Uber. The malicious workflow runs on code pushes or manual triggers, scans repository files and full Git history for credentials, and sends findings in plaintext to attacker infrastructure. Removing the workflow file does not mitigate exposure, as successful executions already leak credentials and old commits may still contain secrets.

AntiMalware•Supply Chain & Open Source

SberTech Launches Platform V Orchestrator for Security Services to Scan Software Before Corporate Deployment

SberTech has announced the launch of a new direction focused on analyzing the security of software prior to its integration into corporate infrastructures. The initiative is built around the company's own Laboratory for Software Verification and the technological platform Platform V Orchestrator for Security Services. This platform combines components for working with both built-in and external analysis tools, enabling checks of digital artifacts, control over software composition and changes, and detection of vulnerabilities, hidden threats, and defects in source code and repositories. SberTech aims to replace fragmented checks and manual result processing with a single managed process, allowing scaled verification without proportional team growth. The move responds to the adoption of hundreds of products from various vendors, widespread use of open-source components, and rising attacks on software supply chains. Primary customers include banks, industrial enterprises, telecom operators, energy companies, and the public sector. The solution is offered as a standalone product that supports on-premises deployment and operation in isolated environments such as private clouds and dedicated data processing contours.

Security NEXT•Supply Chain & Open Source

NEC Subcontractor Suffers Cyber Attack Leading to Customer System Disruptions and Personal Data Leak

NEC disclosed that a subcontractor handling system development and maintenance was compromised in a cyber attack during late September 2026. Attackers stole legitimate account credentials and used them to access multiple customer environments from the subcontractor's systems. The intrusion resulted in server files being encrypted, rendering customer systems inoperable. Additional files containing personal information and system details were exfiltrated from a shared cloud storage platform used for coordination between NEC, the subcontractor, and customers. Affected customers have been notified individually, with further details on compromised personal data to be provided as they become available. The incident highlights risks associated with third-party vendor access in IT supply chains.

Habr•Supply Chain & Open Source

OVHcloud CLI Compromised: Infostealer Distributed Through Hijacked GitHub Releases for 25 Minutes

On October 19, the official OVHcloud CLI tool was compromised when an attacker used a hijacked developer account to replace binaries in five existing releases from v0.11.0 to v0.15.0. The attack lasted from 15:47 to 16:12 Moscow time, with the infostealer targeting API keys, SSH keys, and other secrets stored on developer and CI machines. The malicious binaries were uploaded directly via the GitHub Releases API, and the checksums.txt file was also replaced to match the tampered archives. Only users who had hardcoded the original SHA-256 hash in their CI pipelines, such as one customer who opened issue #300, detected the tampering when builds failed. The compromised account HassenBF had been infected with GlassWorm malware since March 2025, allowing persistent access until the October attack. OVH responded by deleting the malicious files at 17:21 and releasing v0.16.0 with immutable releases and attestation enabled.