Positive Technologies to Explore AI Attacks and Autonomous SOC Advances at PSD 2026
Positive Technologies will hold its annual Positive Security Day 2026 conference in Moscow on 15-16 October, with a central focus on the transformation of cybersecurity driven by artificial intelligence.
The company plans to present updates to its MaxPatrol O2 platform and outline progress toward an autonomous SOC. A new approach called Security Lakehouse will also be introduced as a way to manage large volumes of security data and prepare them for model training.
Additional announcements will cover enhancements to MaxPatrol Endpoint Security for device protection and the continued development of PT X, a comprehensive protection model that includes accountability for outcomes.
Practical activities will include hands-on zones and competitions where participants can attack AI technologies, investigate incidents, test products, and examine their internal workings alongside engineers. A dedicated area will showcase ML and AI developments ranging from deployed solutions to ongoing experiments.
The business track will bring together customers, partners, and company leadership to discuss the impact of AI on business risks and the economics of protection, with emphasis on automating security processes without creating additional post-incident explanation burdens.
The event runs from 10:00 each day at the Mechta complex in Gorky Park. Registration and the full program are available on the conference website for both in-person and online attendance.
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