Supply Chain Attacks Target Ledger Hardware Wallets with Evolving Backdoors
After Ledger announced on 10 October that a backdoor embedded in several Ledger Nano X wallets sold in Southeast Asia had allowed thieves to steal roughly 102 million dollars in cryptocurrency, reports emerged of similar implants discovered in devices sold in Germany.
Initial hardware implants were found in an unknown number of Ledger Nano X units sold by the authorized Malaysian reseller CryptoBilis. Ledger initially stated the implants were limited to a single reseller batch. A European owner later reported finding implants in a Nano X purchased in August from the large electronics retailer MediaMarkt and in a second unit bought the following week from another MediaMarkt store, suggesting supply-chain compromise.
Users and researchers subsequently reported implants in Ledger Flex and Ledger Stax devices from Ledger’s newer product lines. The implants appear to be more advanced iterations of those first identified by hardware hacker Joe Grand earlier in the year. Grand had notified Ledger in March after discovering backdoors in multiple Nano X units purchased from suspicious online sellers, yet received limited follow-up until he publicly presented his findings at conferences in April and May.
The most recent implants were discovered in wallets sold through authorized channels, indicating attackers have shifted tactics to target trusted resellers. Bitquery analysis linked the October theft to approximately 315 compromised accounts connected to CryptoBilis devices, with stolen assets including Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Tron. Some funds have been frozen, while others reside on addresses previously flagged for fraud.
Mark Karpeles, the former Mt. Gox CEO, purchased two Ledger devices after reading Grand’s research and identified even more sophisticated implants. One version used a custom orange flexible PCB and a smaller battery; a later revision featured a black flexible PCB, erased markings, and an antenna silk-screened with the identifier AC-A2016-NANO-V1.1, indicating purpose-built components for mass production.
Ledger has stated it has found no evidence of compromise to its own infrastructure and reminded authorized resellers that returned devices must not be resold. CryptoBilis confirmed it is cooperating with the investigation. The company changed ownership in March, a fact that only became public after the thefts.
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