Telegram Will Not Allow Scanning of Private Chats — Pavel Durov Strongly Criticizes EU Over Chat Control Initiative
Pavel Durov, founder of the messaging platform Telegram, has delivered a sharp rebuke to the European Union over renewed efforts to advance the Chat Control initiative. The proposal, which has resurfaced in EU legislative discussions, could authorize or require online services to scan private messages, emails, and photographs in order to detect prohibited content.
Durov reacted forcefully to the development, stating that methods previously associated with banana republics are now being employed within the EU to push through surveillance legislation. He made it unequivocally clear that Telegram will not scan users’ personal messages, irrespective of any regulatory maneuvers attempted by European authorities.
The founder reiterated the platform’s longstanding position: private correspondence must not be converted into material for mass automated monitoring. This stance directly challenges the direction of the proposed Chat Control regulation currently under debate.
Background on the Legislative Initiative
The European Parliament has returned the bill linked to the Chat Control initiative for further consideration. Earlier drafts explored the possibility of allowing online platforms to voluntarily scan user-generated content, including text messages and media files, with the stated goal of identifying illegal material.
Opponents of the measure contend that the legislation would establish a de facto system of mass surveillance of private communications, despite being presented under the banner of public safety. Proponents, however, maintain that such scanning capabilities are essential for combating illegal content and safeguarding users online.
In this ongoing debate, Telegram has aligned itself firmly with privacy advocates. Durov’s statements signal that the service intends to resist any attempts to transform encrypted personal chats into accessible data streams for regulatory oversight, even as the EU continues to tighten requirements for technology platforms.
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