RWB Infra x Security Meetup Shares Recordings on GitLab Scaling, Kubernetes Bare Metal, Vault PKI and DevSecOps Platforms
On 3 October in Moscow, RWB hosted the Infra x Security Meetup, an event that brought together infrastructure and information-security specialists. The program was split into two parallel tracks, with eight talks delivered by company experts.
The infrastructure track opened with a session on scaling GitLab CE under rapidly increasing load. Andrey Shmelkov and Kirill Melnikov described how user, project and pipeline growth forced changes to architecture, performance tuning and backup-restore procedures, ultimately cutting cluster-migration time by a significant factor.
Alexander Vasilyev and Dmitry Sidorov presented the development journey of the company’s DCIM product, illustrating concrete trade-offs between implementation convenience, business requirements, deadlines and technical constraints.
Stanislav Gabenov explained how Vault was used to create a unified trust infrastructure, covering certificate lifecycle management, policy enforcement and automated issuance, rotation and revocation across the corporate environment.
The final infrastructure talk, delivered by Oleg Semenov, examined real-world differences between seemingly identical bare-metal servers, Intel versus AMD platform behaviour, Linux kernel versions and their impact on Kubernetes stability in production.
In the security track, Alexander Emelyanov described the evolution from simple pipeline scanning to an ASOC and later ASPM platform, stressing the need to involve development, platform and security teams together.
Maxim Yanson outlined vulnerability-management tooling that shortened remediation cycles and incorporated LLM-assisted analysis under the specific constraints of the company’s infrastructure.
Konstantin Chernyak discussed data protection once a single perimeter no longer exists, advocating a model built on Identity × Data × Context × Policy and tighter integration between Data Governance and Security.
The closing security session, presented by Alexander Chernykhov, showed how six engineers now manage access to one thousand systems with an average request-to-grant time of 90 seconds through role-based automation, repeatable processes and measurable metrics.
Full video recordings and presentation slides from every talk are available on YouTube and VK. RWB encourages readers to subscribe to its Telegram channel for announcements of future events.
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