EIP-7702 Explained: How Ethereum's New Signature Standard Enables Persistent Wallet Delegation Attacks
EIP-7702 allows ordinary Ethereum Externally Owned Accounts to execute smart-contract code without changing their address or private key. The feature, activated on 7 May 2025 during the Pectra upgrade, creates new convenience and new risks for wallet users.
Attackers trick victims into signing an EIP-7702 authorization that points the account to a malicious contract. The contract can then transfer ETH, tokens, and NFTs without requiring additional signatures from the owner. Because the delegation remains in the account state until replaced or cleared, funds can disappear long after the original signature and even after the user has left the malicious site.
The authorization message contains chain_id, the target contract address, and the account nonce. It is signed with the standard secp256k1 curve and encoded as keccak256(0x05 || rlp([chain_id, address, nonce])). Unlike an ERC-20 approve, the signature grants the contract the ability to run arbitrary code in the context of the victim address, potentially affecting all assets and future deposits.
Researchers found that more than 80 percent of observed delegations shortly after Pectra pointed to variants of automatic-drain contracts. A later 2026 study across seven networks identified 924 malicious delegated accounts linked to over $2.3 million in losses, with more than $10 million in assets still at risk. One publicized incident involved the address sven.eth, which lost roughly 9 ETH before partial recovery.
MetaMask and other wallets restrict arbitrary delegations, yet users can still be tricked through applications that support the new transaction type 0x04. Revoking a delegation requires a new authorization pointing to the zero address; simply logging out or reinstalling the wallet does not remove the on-chain pointer.
Security experts recommend checking any address on Etherscan for a “Delegated Address” field or using the cast code command against a trusted RPC endpoint. When a suspicious authorization has already been signed, users should stop depositing funds, verify the current delegation state, and revoke it only through trusted wallet software.
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