North Korean Hacker Groups: Lazarus, Kimsuky, Andariel and Financial Clusters Behind Billions in Thefts
North Korean hackers steal billions of dollars, exfiltrate military technologies, surveil politicians and journalists, and sometimes secure programming jobs at foreign companies under false identities. These operations are conducted by specialized groups, many working on behalf of North Korean intelligence and state structures.
How North Korea’s Hacker Ecosystem Is Organized
A significant portion of overseas cyber operations is attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). Open sources also mention Bureau 121, Lab 110, and other units. Separate operations are linked to the Ministry of State Security and structures of the Workers’ Party of Korea. No complete organizational chart is publicly available.
Researchers assign names based on tools, servers, intrusion methods, and victim selection. Microsoft uses designations such as Diamond Sleet and Emerald Sleet, while CrowdStrike prefers names ending in Chollima. In July 2026 Google began transitioning to a new taxonomy in which North Korean groups receive names containing NEPTUNE.
Lazarus Group and Its Subdivisions
Lazarus Group specializes in cyber espionage, financial crime, destructive attacks, and technology theft. The group is linked to the 2014 destruction of Sony Pictures data, the theft of $81 million from the Bangladesh central bank in 2016, and the 2017 distribution of WannaCry. Lazarus is also connected to numerous operations against banks and cryptocurrency organizations.
Labyrinth Chollima and Diamond Sleet focus on strategic espionage targeting defense technologies, industry, telecommunications, and critical infrastructure. In January 2026 CrowdStrike split the former Labyrinth Chollima into three tracks: the main cluster retained the name, while the financial tracks were named Golden Chollima and Pressure Chollima.
UNC2970 steals defense, aerospace, and energy research through fake job offers. The group studies victims’ professional backgrounds and sends malicious files disguised as legitimate job materials, including a modified version of SumatraPDF.
Financial Crime Clusters
APT38 and BeagleBoyz have conducted bank heists and attacks on payment systems since at least 2014, including the Bangladesh Bank operation and the FASTCash scheme that manipulated ATM withdrawal approvals.
BlueNoroff, also tracked as Sapphire Sleet and Midnight Neptune, specializes in cryptocurrency theft from investment funds, exchanges, and financial-application developers. Operators pose as investors or business partners and trick victims into installing malicious trading applications.
Pressure Chollima and TraderTraitor were linked to the February 2025 theft of approximately $1.5 billion from Bybit and the October 2026 theft of roughly $6.36 billion from Binance. Both incidents involved compromise of developer infrastructure and transaction-signing mechanisms.
Political and Military Espionage Groups
Kimsuky and APT43 target diplomats, journalists, researchers, and think tanks, focusing on U.S. and South Korean policy toward Pyongyang. The group frequently impersonates journalists to build trust with victims.
APT37 (also known as ScarCruft) primarily targets South Korea and other Asian countries, monitoring defectors and human-rights activists. In May 2026 the group was found compromising a gaming platform used by ethnic Koreans in China’s Yanbian region.
Andariel (also APT45) combines intelligence collection on nuclear and defense technologies with ransomware operations, including deployment of the Maui ransomware against U.S. healthcare organizations.
Fake IT Workers and Contagious Interviews
Famous Chollima and Jasper Sleet create fabricated résumés, pass interviews, and obtain remote developer positions at foreign companies, often using intermediaries to receive company laptops. Some operators work at multiple organizations simultaneously.
Contagious Interview operators pose as employers, sending malicious code samples or project tasks during recruitment processes. The campaign has distributed tools such as BeaverTail and OtterCookie through GitHub repositories and developer packages.
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