AntiMalware•November 2, 2026•🇷🇺Translated from Russian

Russian Li Auto Owners Face Master Account Theft and Extortion Up to 45,000 Rubles

Russian owners of Li Auto vehicles have encountered a new wave of master-account thefts that grant attackers remote control over the cars via the official mobile application.

After losing access, some vehicles experience disabled infotainment screens and climate control, while others face starting problems. Attackers subsequently offer to restore the account in exchange for payment.

Autonews.ru reported multiple extortion cases, and the issue was confirmed by a representative of Sinomach Auto, the official distributor of Li Auto in Russia. According to Alexander Rasskazov, co-founder of the Lixiang owners club, roughly 20 victims are known so far, with demanded sums ranging between 35,000 and 45,000 rubles.

The master account is directly linked to vehicle management through the branded application. Consequences vary: some owners see their car disappear from the profile entirely, while others lose individual functions. One victim was still able to operate the vehicle using a physical key after the Bluetooth key stopped working.

The precise theft mechanism has not yet been identified. Rasskazov noted that even owners who paid for Chinese phone numbers through the eSender service, previously considered a safeguard, are now being targeted.

Li Auto and its distributor are currently developing protective measures and an official account-recovery procedure. They also intend to switch account binding from Chinese phone numbers to email addresses. The new solutions are expected to cover both officially imported vehicles and parallel-import cars, although no timeline has been announced.

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