US Mandates Removal of Acronis from Federal Systems by January 2027 Over Russian Ties
US federal civilian agencies have been directed to remove Acronis products from their information systems by January 27, 2027, with new acquisitions also banned. The order, issued by the Department of Homeland Security, applies to Acronis AG and its related entities including Acronis Inc. and Acronis SCS.
The directive was signed on July 31 but only published in the Federal Register on October 30. It stems from a review lasting nearly a decade that focused on potential ongoing Russian developer involvement in the code and the adequacy of supply chain risk reductions. No concrete evidence of backdoors linking products to Moscow was disclosed by the sources cited by Nextgov/FCW.
Following the 2022 events, Acronis halted its operations in Russia and relocated its specialists to other countries. In 2025, Swedish investment firm EQT acquired a controlling stake, a transaction that received approval from the CFIUS committee. The company states that more than 75 percent of its shares are now held by Western investors.
Despite these changes, the measures were deemed insufficient for continued presence in federal systems. Purchasing the software through intermediaries is also prohibited under the new rules. The restrictions do not apply to the broader private-sector market in the United States.
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