Scammer Leverages Unstoppable Domains to Redirect ATOM Transfers via Fake IBC Address
A Telegram scammer contacted a cybersecurity journalist with an offer to earn cryptocurrency by timing liquidity-pool deposits. After explaining the supposed strategy, the fraudster insisted the journalist buy ATOM on Bybit and transfer the tokens to the Edge wallet.
The attacker then claimed that the IBC protocol could instantly convert the ATOM into XRP and return it with profit to the journalist’s Bybit deposit address. The journalist was told to append the suffix -ibc.x to the exchange’s shared XRP address r4rjtVAtG3gmcDHU3nmXdYKcVSbvGPF7Fa.
When the resulting string was pasted into Edge, the wallet accepted it and displayed a Cosmos-format recipient address. The journalist recognized the string as a pre-registered Unstoppable Domains name that mapped the .x domain to an attacker-controlled Cosmos wallet for ATOM transfers.
Blockchain records for the Cosmos address revealed 147 incoming transactions totaling 22,316.56 ATOM between 18 July and 26 October. One victim alone sent 11 transfers that escalated from 14.72 to 704.56 ATOM.
The journalist later purchased the domains sansmaster.x and sansmaster.crypto and configured multiple cryptocurrency addresses. Tests confirmed that Edge, Trust Wallet, and OKX Wallet correctly resolved the domains, while MetaMask did not.
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