Habr•November 6, 2026•🇷🇺Translated from Russian

Anthropic Report: Unreleased Claude Model Builds Working Exploits for Chrome, Safari, Android, Windows and Linux

Anthropic's Frontier Red Team has released a detailed report describing how an unreleased internal version of Claude autonomously discovered vulnerabilities in Chrome, Safari, Android, Windows and the Linux kernel, then chained the flaws into reproducible attacks.

Until recently, AI models were used mainly to suggest areas for human researchers to investigate. The new report shows the model independently identifying memory-safety issues, bypassing sandboxes and address-space randomisation, and producing working proof-of-concept exploits with minimal human direction.

Chrome

The most detailed case involves Chrome on macOS. The model found a memory corruption bug in the V8 JavaScript engine, escaped the V8 sandbox, defeated ASLR, abused a race condition in CacheStorage to read cross-process data, and finally leveraged a flaw in FedCM to execute code outside the browser sandbox. Opening a malicious page was sufficient to launch Calculator, demonstrating arbitrary code execution. Anthropic reported 62 vulnerabilities to Google, all assigned high or critical CVEs; 13 were sandbox escapes. Fixes shipped in Chrome 156.

Safari

For Safari the model used a different chain involving JavaScriptCore, Gigacage bypass and an inter-process communication issue. The resulting exploit did not execute code but removed same-origin restrictions, allowing a malicious page to read browsing history, cookies and authenticated session data such as email contents. Apple acknowledged the report the same day and released a patch.

Android

On Android the model combined three vulnerabilities to bypass USB restrictions, pairing codes and file-content checks on a locked Pixel 9. With only physical USB access the device yielded photographs and personal data. Google has issued fixes, although public CVE records are still pending.

Windows and Linux

On Windows the model produced a denial-of-service attack against the QUIC implementation in the kernel; a few packets can reboot a server and repeated traffic keeps it offline. The flaw received CVE-2026-33096 and has been patched. On Linux the model discovered a race condition in the network stack leading to a use-after-free. The two-stage exploit first defeats KASLR and then replaces a function pointer to gain root privileges. The attack completed in 53 minutes over the network and received CVE-2026-98432 with a CVSS score of 9.8. A mitigation disabling multipath TCP is available until distributions ship updated kernels.

Anthropic states that human involvement was limited to high-level task assignment and provision of test environments. The company has not released the model publicly, citing concerns that widespread availability would compress the responsible-disclosure timeline from months to hours.

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