Habr•November 16, 2026•🇷🇺Translated from Russian

F6 Open-Sources MCP Server for XDR to Power AI Assistants in SOC Operations

F6 has open-sourced an MCP server for its F6 XDR platform, allowing AI assistants to interact directly with detection and response data. The server was built by the company’s Managed XDR team to automate repetitive tasks for first-line SOC analysts, threat hunters, and non-SOC users such as managers and support engineers.

Model Context Protocol (MCP) is an open standard that lets AI clients connect to external systems. The F6 implementation is a lightweight Python application that runs locally and communicates with F6 XDR over its REST API. It exposes twelve tools covering search, counting, field mapping, filter suggestions, artifact discovery, collection, and limited alert disposition.

The tools include xdr_search, xdr_count, xdr_get_mapping, xdr_get_filters, xdr_get_suggestions, artifact listing and download functions, collection presets, and an optional xdr_mark_event capability that is disabled by default. Sections accessible through the server comprise alerts, incidents, emails, files, host events, network connections, assets, applications, modules, and audit logs.

Configuration requires only a single block in the client’s MCP settings. Examples are provided for OpenCode, with additional support for PyPI installation and a Docker image. Environment variables define the XDR base URL and API key, keeping credentials outside the model context.

Four detailed cases illustrate practical use. Three were executed on a demo tenant with DeepSeek V4.1 Flash running in a Russian cloud. The first case produced email statistics and signature dashboards for F6 Demo, consuming 3.6 million tokens. The second triaged a high-severity YARA alert and correctly identified it as a false positive after reconstructing the timeline. The third extracted indicators and ATT&CK techniques from a Sucuri report on the Balada Injector campaign and searched them across all data sections.

The fourth case came from real incident response. An analyst used the assistant to reconstruct a 16-month infection chain involving memory-resident implants and daily-changing miners. Although artifact collection was added only in version 1.3.0, the assistant guided manual collection and later produced a full attack diagram.

Token consumption and pricing data for the three demo cases are published, showing costs between roughly 256 and 390 rubles depending on the system prompt. The team emphasizes that context is billed on every step and that prompt engineering significantly affects both completeness and cost.

F6 advises organizations to keep collection and alert-modification tools disabled by default, review all AI-generated queries, and maintain human oversight for any action that changes data or system state.

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