ARinteg Earns Golden Partner Status from Ideco for NGFW Security Projects
ARinteg has received the status of Golden Partner Ideco based on the results of joint projects in the field of network security.
The companies link the award to the volume of completed projects and the competencies of the integrator’s technical and commercial teams. Within the partnership, ARinteg supplies and deploys the next-generation firewall Ideco NGFW Novum.
The solution is designed to protect the network perimeter and organize secure remote access. Another area of joint work is the migration of customers from foreign NGFW products to the Ideco platform.
Commercial Director of ARinteg Dmitry Slobodenyuk noted that the new status expands the integrator’s capabilities in joint projects. The company plans to provide customers with more comprehensive support at all stages of implementation, from pilot testing to commissioning.
Head of Partner Relations at Ideco Sergey Markin emphasized the technical expertise of ARinteg. According to him, the vendor is interested in partners capable of executing large-scale projects based on Ideco NGFW under conditions of import substitution and the spread of hybrid infrastructures.
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