Benchmarking AES-GCM and Ascon AEAD Performance on ESP32 and ESP8266 for Industrial Telemetry
Engineers evaluated the practical overhead of authenticated encryption for industrial telemetry by running AES-128-GCM and two Ascon variants on ESP32 (240 MHz) and ESP8266 (80 MHz) boards. The experiment used three distinct traffic profiles—STABLE, MEDIUM, and MAX—varying both packet size (256–1024 bytes) and transmission interval (10 ms to 1.2 s) to simulate realistic sensor data streams containing temperature, vibration, and pressure readings.
Three AEAD implementations were tested: AES-128-GCM with mbedTLS on ESP32 and BearSSL on ESP8266, the original Ascon-128 from the CryptoLW library, and a custom portable C++ port of the NIST-standardized Ascon-AEAD128 based on SP 800-232. All runs employed a fixed 128-bit key, 12-byte AAD, and 16-byte authentication tag, with telemetry generation seeded at 0x42A7F19D for reproducibility.
Hardware instrumentation included a TP-Link access point for isolated Wi-Fi, a Python PC Direct application receiving UDP packets, and a TC66C USB power meter logging current draw. Two test modes were used: EXPRESS (2 970 messages) for rapid iteration and STANDARD (9 000 messages) for sustained load, with algorithm execution order permuted across runs to detect sequencing bias.
Early STANDARD runs exposed severe networking issues on ESP32, with only 6 694 of 9 000 packets successfully delivered under MAX load and thousands of ENOMEM/ENOBUFS errors recorded. After refinements to UDP handling and addition of phase audits, delivery reached 99.856 % on ESP32 and 100 % on ESP8266, eliminating the previous mass losses.
Post-fix AEAD timings for the MAX profile showed AES-GCM averaging 618 µs on ESP32 and 6 420 µs on ESP8266, legacy Ascon-128 at 803 µs and 1 838 µs respectively, and NIST Ascon-AEAD128 at 2 507 µs and 8 595 µs. On the slower ESP8266, legacy Ascon proved roughly 3.5 times faster than AES-GCM, while AES-GCM held a modest edge on ESP32.
The study concludes that cryptographic latency alone rarely determines feasibility; network buffer exhaustion and transmission scheduling frequently dominate under aggressive telemetry rates. The authors emphasize that results reflect specific library–platform combinations rather than intrinsic algorithm superiority.
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