Habr•November 17, 2026•🇷🇺Translated from Russian

Home Lab Overhaul: Securing Proxmox Infrastructure After Discovering 63,000 Forgejo Spam Accounts

A home infrastructure running on a single Proxmox node with multiple Debian LXC containers faced a series of security issues during a routine migration of two Docker stacks. The environment used TrueNAS SCALE for storage, Cloudflare DNS with orange-cloud proxying, MikroTik port forwarding to NPMplus (a Nginx Proxy Manager fork), and CrowdSec WAF. Several admin panels were exposed via Cloudflare Tunnel protected by Cloudflare Access.

After separating services across dedicated LXCs (sabre for perimeter, proteus for monitoring, archon for work tools, and others), the administrator encountered persistent problems with file ownership during bind-mount transfers. Using tar archives with --numeric-owner preserved UID/GID values for PostgreSQL and MariaDB data directories, allowing successful migration without SSH.

Inspection of NPMplus access logs showed every client IP belonging to Cloudflare. The environment variable TRUST_CLOUDFLARE=true had been placed in the wrong Compose service, causing CrowdSec to treat Cloudflare edge nodes as attackers. Moving the variable to the npmplus service restored real client IP visibility.

With accurate logging enabled, the Forgejo Git server was found to contain 63,021 spam accounts promoting casinos and pharmaceuticals. Registration remained open despite earlier observations of bot activity. The operator disabled new registrations and enforced sign-in requirements via Forgejo environment variables, then recreated the instance from verified mirror repositories to avoid manual cleanup.

Further review of Cloudflare Tunnel routes uncovered an unprotected legacy RDP path and overly permissive device enrollment rules. These were removed, and access policies were reorganized into three categories: public applications using native authentication plus CrowdSec, limited browser access via email OTP, and admin access requiring WARP device registration plus TOTP on Guacamole.

All direct port forwarding was eliminated in favor of a Cloudflare Tunnel terminating at NPMplus. This removed dependency on DDNS, ensured consistent WAF inspection, and maintained internal HTTPS via local DNS overrides while respecting the 100 MB file-size limit only for external uploads.

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