F5 CISO Warns AI Is Eroding Core Skills Among Cybersecurity Professionals
Joshua Goldfarb, Field CISO at F5 and former analysis supervisor at US-CERT, has issued a stark warning that AI is making the cybersecurity profession worse. In a November 14 article published by SecurityWeek, he describes how young analysts now paste alert text straight into AI interfaces rather than reviewing logs, tracing traffic, or checking assets. While the resulting reports look polished, analysts lose the ability to spot when the AI has chosen the wrong direction.
A Request That Treated a Human Expert Like an AI
Goldfarb recounts recommending a colleague to speak at an event he could not attend. The substitute later asked him for presentation content in the style of an AI prompt: “tell me the most interesting points on topic X and create a demo.” Goldfarb provided guidance but later reflected that the colleague had adopted the posture of speaking to a large language model instead of seeking genuine experience and judgment.
Six Capabilities AI Is Quietly Removing
Goldfarb identifies six subtle but critical losses:
- Creativity — the intuition to notice anomalies others miss and to devise unconventional attack paths that AI cannot originate from existing data.
- Humor — the hard-won skill of using self-deprecating remarks to ease tension in high-pressure environments and to deliver bad news acceptably.
- Emotion — genuine care that makes colleagues willing to stay late during incidents, something AI can only simulate.
- Information delivery — distinctive, memorable messaging that stands out at conferences instead of generic AI-generated content filled with buzzwords.
- Communication — precise technical language that avoids dangerous ambiguity; AI polishing often flattens critical details.
- Critical thinking — the capacity to reason through novel situations without ready answers, which atrophies when every problem is outsourced to AI.
Why Security Cannot Afford Outsourced Thinking
In Chinese enterprise security teams, where staff already juggle penetration testing, compliance, incident response, and reporting, AI appears to be an ideal colleague that never complains. Yet security is a domain where mistakes carry personal accountability. When analysts cannot independently verify AI outputs, they sign off on recommendations they cannot defend. New analysts who begin by asking AI first never develop the muscle memory of packet analysis, malware disassembly, or attack-chain mapping, leaving teams unprepared for zero-day threats.
Clear Boundaries for Responsible AI Use
Goldfarb continues to write every article under his own name without AI assistance for ideation, research, outlining, or drafting. He advocates a strict line: AI may handle retrieval, format conversion, and initial log clustering, but final judgments on alert classification, containment decisions, and external statements must remain human and traceable.
Five Practical Recommendations for Security Teams
- Require human sign-off and audit trails for alert severity, response actions, and external notifications.
- Treat AI as an exoskeleton that amplifies existing skills rather than a substitute that replaces them; measure whether understanding improves after use.
- During post-incident reviews, routinely ask what the analyst would have done without AI to surface skill gaps.
- Ensure newcomers still perform packet captures, vulnerability reproductions, and full attack-chain diagrams by hand.
- Preserve authentic voice in communications to business and executive stakeholders instead of template language.
AI will not eliminate the security profession, but it will divide practitioners into two groups: those who use it to sharpen judgment and those who become dependent on it. The decisive factor is whether professionals retain the willingness to think problems through themselves.
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