Four VLESS VPN Configurations Show Varying Lifespans Before Network Restrictions
An independent researcher publishing on Habr under the nickname PXI released findings from a controlled experiment that tested the longevity of four VLESS VPN stands against Russian network restrictions.
The stands used two TLS obfuscation methods: REALITY and Self-SNI TLS. Each method was evaluated both in direct mode and via an intermediate server hosted inside Russia.
The REALITY configuration routed through an intermediate server remained operational for four months before the author voluntarily shut it down. Direct REALITY connections lasted roughly three months before encountering blocks. The two Self-SNI TLS stands lost connectivity after eight days and three days respectively.
In several instances, previously restricted IP addresses regained accessibility later, indicating that blocks may have targeted either individual servers or entire subnets. The experiment did not produce conclusive evidence of active server probing.
One stand’s logs contained an anomalous HTTP request whose source could not be identified due to incomplete logging. The author links tunnel discovery to passive metadata analysis that examines packet sizes, timing intervals, session lengths and the ratio of inbound to outbound traffic.
No definitive proof of machine-learning classifiers or specific DPI rule sets was obtained. Because the four stands differed in traffic volume, transport parameters and operational duration, and because all servers belonged to a single hosting provider, the results cannot isolate the exact cause of the restrictions or prove the superiority of any single configuration.
Related articles
Bye, Censor! Android App Routes Telegram and YouTube Through Local Proxy to Evade System VPN Detection
A Russian developer frustrated with music service censorship in Yandex Music and VK Music has released an open-source Android application called Bye, Censor! that provides selective proxy access instead of registering as a system-wide VPN. The tool uses the Xray core to run a password-protected SOCKS5 or HTTP proxy on localhost, allowing only configured applications such as Telegram, Firefox, and browsers to route traffic while leaving banking and other apps unaffected. The motivation stems from Android reporting VPN status to all applications, causing services to block functionality even when their own traffic does not traverse the VPN tunnel. Users must disable any system VPN, import a VLESS or VMess configuration link, and manually set proxy settings in Telegram and browser extensions such as Proxy Toggle. The application deliberately avoids system-level registration to prevent detection by apps that refuse to operate under VPN conditions. The author notes that the solution targets the most common use cases of browsing, messaging, and video streaming while accepting that other applications may remain subject to restrictions.
Pocket Android: Open-Source App Uses Work Profiles to Isolate Apps Behind Dedicated Proxies
A developer has released Pocket Android, a free open-source application that leverages Android's built-in Work Profile feature to create an isolated environment for selected apps. The tool routes traffic from cloned applications exclusively through user-defined proxies while keeping banking, delivery, and government services in the main profile on direct connections. It addresses common failures of per-app exclusion lists by enforcing strict lockdown policies that prevent leaks after reboots or proxy drops. The project builds on the Shelter codebase and integrates Xray for protocol support including VLESS, REALITY, and Hysteria 2. Battery impact is minimized through event-driven status checks rather than constant timers. The approach provides practical privacy separation for services sensitive to IP changes such as Claude and ChatGPT without requiring manual proxy switching throughout the day.
Telegram Beta for macOS Introduces Hidden Chats Feature Protected by Secret Passphrase
The beta version of Telegram 13.2.0 for macOS now includes a Hidden Chats function that lets users move selected chats and channels out of the main list into a separate section accessible only via a secret passphrase. Users configure the feature in the privacy settings by entering a passphrase of at least eight Latin characters twice. Multiple passphrases can be created, each unlocking its own set of hidden conversations. The hidden section automatically closes after screen lock, sleep mode, or five minutes of inactivity, and calls from hidden chats are silenced. The passphrase is not stored anywhere on the device, so forgotten credentials require logging out and back in to regain access on that computer. The feature is device-specific and does not sync across platforms, meaning hidden chats remain visible in the main list on smartphones and other clients.
Windows 11 Telemetry Secretly Tracks AI Coding Agents and Developer Tools via MissionControlAggregator
Reverse engineering of Windows 11 binaries revealed a hardcoded list of coding agents and developer tools inside MissionControlAggregator.dll. The component monitors launches of applications such as codex.exe, claude.exe, copilot.exe, cursor.exe, python.exe, gcc.exe and code.exe through existing ETW events from KernelProcess and Win32kTraceLogging. Detected usage is stored as bit flags in SubCohorts reports and sent to Microsoft when optional diagnostic data is enabled, which remains the default on US installations. Researchers confirmed the mechanism by renaming cmd.exe to codex.exe and observing the corresponding bit set in Segments.SubCohorts events queued by DiagTrack. The feature CLICodingAgentUsage (ID 62580080) categorizes both CLI and desktop agents without collecting prompts or source code. Data collection occurs on standard Windows 11 ARM64 builds and persists in AggregatorStorage even without user interaction with the listed tools.