securitylab_n•July 15, 2026•🇷🇺Translated from Russian

Russia's МВД Proposes Mandatory Purchase of Special Smartphones for Migrants to Enable Permanent Digital Location Tracking

Russia's Ministry of Internal Affairs is developing a new system of permanent digital surveillance over labor migrants that would require them to purchase a special smartphone upon entering the country.

Deputy Minister Igor Zubov told the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs that foreign nationals arriving for work or long-term stays would be obliged to buy a government-approved device. An electronic profile would be created on the smartphone, enabling police to track the owner's location continuously and block any move from one settlement to another without prior approval.

The same device would also deliver automatic notifications about expiring documents, reducing unintentional violations of migration rules.

The proposal extends an existing control framework. Since September 2025, migrants in Moscow and the Moscow region have been required to install the "Amina" application, which transmits geolocation data to the МВД. Failure to transmit location information for more than three working days results in removal from migration registration and placement on a controlled-persons list, which can lead to deportation.

By mid-December, authorities reported that more than 139,000 individuals had been deregistered through this mechanism. Starting 1 July 2026, all visa-free foreign nationals must register their entry via the RuID application and create a digital profile. A centralized state database operated by the МВД, containing information on documents, employment, housing, fines, and telephone numbers of every foreigner, has been active since 30 June.

The key distinction of Zubov's initiative is that current regulations only require installation of software on a migrant's existing phone, whereas the new plan would make purchase of a dedicated device a mandatory condition of entry itself.

Similar ideas have previously drawn criticism from human rights defenders. In 2020, activist Svetlana Gannushkina argued that obliging people to buy an expensive device is unlawful, as many migrants lack the necessary funds, technical skills, or access to such technology.

The latest proposal has been presented only as a long-term plan and has not yet been formalized in legislation; therefore, the compulsory purchase of a special smartphone is not currently required for entry into Russia.

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