US Accuses Russian Cybersecurity Specialist D.O. of Void Blizzard Attacks on European Governments and US Companies, Kaspersky Ties Emerge
American authorities have formally accused Russian information security specialist D.O. of involvement in a series of cyberattacks attributed to the hacking group Void Blizzard, also known as Laundry Bear. The charges, presented in a Boston court, allege that the group has been stealing emails and other communications from government organizations in European countries cooperating with NATO, as well as from at least eleven American companies, beginning in 2023.
D.O. did not enter a guilty plea during the court proceedings. According to information drawn from social media profiles and publicly available resumes, he graduated from the Bauman Moscow State Technical University with a specialization in information security. European journalists have previously described the university as one of the institutions that may train personnel later involved in operations conducted by state structures, although the university itself has not commented on these claims.
The accused previously held a senior position at one of Russia’s largest cybersecurity companies, widely understood to be Kaspersky. The exact nature of his role within the company has not been disclosed. His employment there ended several years before the start of the hacking campaign described by prosecutors. In 2024 the US Department of Commerce prohibited the sale and use of the company’s software in the United States, citing national security threats. European authorities had earlier issued similar risk warnings.
The indictment also connects D.O. to a second IT company based in Nizhny Novgorod, where he served as deputy director starting in 2024. Although the indictment itself does not mention his earlier work at the major cybersecurity firm, this information surfaced later through salary documents and confirmation from a former colleague. The defense attorney declined to discuss the defendant’s employment history.
Specialists observe that transitions between commercial cybersecurity companies and state intelligence structures occur in various countries. Nevertheless, until the court delivers a final ruling, D.O.’s alleged participation in the Void Blizzard operations remains unproven.
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