Russia's Supreme Court Bans Silent Crow and Cyberpartisans BY as Extremist Organizations
The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation has recognized the cybercriminal groups Silent Crow (also known as the Silent Crow) and Cyberpartisans BY as extremist organizations and prohibited their activities on Russian territory. The decision is subject to immediate enforcement following a closed session in which the court granted an administrative claim filed by the General Prosecutor's Office.
According to the ruling, both groups conducted coordinated attacks on the information infrastructure of Russia and Belarus. Their stated goals, as presented by the authorities, include destabilizing the socio-political situation and effecting an unconstitutional change of state power.
The court established that Cyberpartisans BY belong to the Belarusian association Supratsiv (Resistance), which advocates the violent alteration of the republic's constitutional order. The group was further connected to the Polk named after Kastus Kalinouski, already banned in Russia, and to a subunit of information-psychological operations within the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Silent Crow, previously operating under the names CyberWar and Cyber LegionsUA, is characterized in the judgment as a pro-Ukrainian alliance of politically motivated hacktivists. Its principal objective, according to the court, is to inflict damage on Russian government agencies, commercial enterprises, and critical information infrastructure.
The groups are accused of carrying out cyberattacks against the IT systems of Aeroflot, databases belonging to Rostelecom and Rosreestr, as well as servers of the Belarusian Railway. As a result of the ruling, both Silent Crow and Cyberpartisans BY now hold not only a digital but also an official extremist status in Russia, making participation in their activities or provision of support subject to criminal or administrative liability.
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