HackerSec Launches AI-Native Pentest Platform with Yaga Agent for Automated Offensive Testing
HackerSec, an offensive cybersecurity company, has launched a major update to its pentest platform featuring a new Pentest AI-Native technology. In this model, an AI agent takes over complete execution of offensive tests while human specialists only monitor the operation and validate each vulnerability.
The platform performs reconnaissance, enumeration, validations, exploitations, impact confirmation, and evidence production autonomously. Cybercriminals are already deploying AI agents to automate reconnaissance, identify vulnerabilities, and scale offensive campaigns. At the same time, organizations across sectors accelerate development with AI, producing more updates, more production code, and a constantly expanding attack surface that requires pentesting to keep pace.
In the AI-Native model, the intelligence receives the scope, investigates the environment, interprets system responses, formulates hypotheses, and adapts its strategy based on results. The agent maintains full operational context and continues exploring different paths until confirming whether a vulnerability is truly exploitable, enabling complete, continuous testing with reduced human intervention.
At the center of the platform is Yaga, the pentest agent developed from scratch by HackerSec. The technology uses a proprietary harness that coordinates tools, playbooks, multiple analysis stages, and different AI models during the same execution. Instead of depending on the reasoning of a single model, Yaga combines distinct capabilities to interpret the target, select techniques, execute authorized attacks, and technically validate findings.
Results published on YagaBench demonstrate the impact of this multi-model architecture. The production configuration of Yaga, operating with four combined models, solved 91.2% of black box scenarios, 94.6% of gray box scenarios, and 93.5% of white box scenarios. This performance highlights that the platform's advantage lies in the proprietary offensive orchestration layer developed by HackerSec.
“Our goal is to achieve, by the end of the year, more than 98% effectiveness in all AI-Native pentests with Yaga,” commented Andrew Martinez, CEO of HackerSec. New cyber environments change at a speed that no longer matches point-in-time pentests, long cycles, and high dependence on manual execution. The AI-Native model allows companies to perform offensive testing more frequently, expand coverage, and reduce the time between vulnerability emergence and identification while keeping human experts responsible for monitoring and technical validation.
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