Habr•July 25, 2026•🇷🇺Translated from Russian

Russia's Article 10.1 on Personal Data Dissemination: Apparent and Real Contradictions in Federal Law 152-FZ

Part II of the series examines whether the text of Article 10.1 of Federal Law 152-FZ is workable after the concept was completely rewritten between the first and second readings without public discussion. The analysis focuses on three questions that any operator must answer: the meaning of the key terms 'access', 'dissemination' and 'provision'; the legal basis on which a person who obtained data from an open source may process them; and how restrictions set by the data subject reach that person and what happens when they are violated.

The author compares the terminology of 152-FZ with the general information law 149-FZ, both adopted on the same day in 2006. While 152-FZ defines both dissemination and provision through the undefined term 'disclosure', 149-FZ supplies a usable definition of 'access' as the possibility of obtaining information and using it. This definition is treated as a state rather than an action, which helps explain some provisions but creates new contradictions elsewhere.

Part 9 of Article 10.1 allows the data subject to prohibit an operator from transferring data to an unlimited circle of persons except by providing access, and to prohibit that circle from processing the data except by obtaining access. The first prohibition is coherent: the operator may keep data publicly available where consent permits but may not sell arrays, fulfil individual requests or otherwise transfer the data. The second prohibition, however, leads to an irresolvable collision because the word 'use' appears both in the definition of access and in the list of processing operations, making any consistent reading either ban reading the published data or permit almost all forms of processing.

The original draft by deputy Gorelkin had preserved the ground of public availability under Article 6 while conditioning it on the subject's conditions and prohibitions. This ground was removed during the second reading, and the special regime moved to Article 10.1 without a corresponding processing basis for subsequent operators. Judicial practice, including cases such as А40-5250/2017 and several 2022–2024 decisions, confirms that openness alone does not authorise processing; each subsequent operator must establish its own ground under Article 6.

Two readings of the special consent are possible. Under the 'portable consent' reading, the consent would authorise further processing by an unlimited circle within the recorded limits; under the narrower reading, it only authorises the primary operator's disclosure and every other person must find an independent ground. Courts appear to favour the narrower view, leaving the conditions and prohibitions without a legal foundation that would make them effective.

Parts 11 and 15 expressly exclude processing in state, public or other legally defined public interests and processing by state and municipal bodies from the operation of the article. These carve-outs were deliberately retained and expanded during the second reading. The resulting structure therefore preserves the subject's ability to set conditions while simultaneously removing the legal basis those conditions were intended to regulate.

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