Beeline Subscribers Targeted in Mass SIM Hijacking via Remote eSIM Issuance
Beeline subscribers have reported mass attempts to hijack their mobile numbers through the remote issuance of eSIM cards. According to Kommersant FM, fraudsters needed only one careless confirmation from the user to complete the attack.
The scheme appeared highly convincing: a system-level prompt appeared on the smartphone screen requesting login to the operator's personal account. This was neither an SMS nor a standard push notification. Once the confirmation button was pressed, a message followed about the issuance of a virtual SIM card. The physical SIM was simultaneously blocked, transferring control of the number to the attackers.
One victim was Kommersant FM editor-in-chief Vladislav Viktorov. IT specialist Alexander Baulin suggested the attack might involve a breach of the operator's infrastructure, but Beeline did not confirm this version.
The company informed Kod Durova about a coordinated attack on mechanisms for remote SIM issuance and replacement. Over several days, fraudsters changed tactics and sent thousands of requests. Beeline claims the attack was repelled and successful hijackings remained isolated. Affected subscribers are receiving assistance to restore service.
According to the operator, similar attacks since the beginning of the year have affected the entire telecom market. Subscribers are advised not to confirm operations they did not initiate, not to share SMS codes, and to contact support immediately for suspicious requests.
Number hijacking goes beyond sudden loss of network signal. With control of the SIM, fraudsters can attempt to restore access to banking applications, Gosuslugi, and other services. Users should therefore read any system notification carefully, as one accidental tap can hand the number to an unauthorized party.
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