redb 3.4.0 Adds Replay Checkpoints, Shared Runtime Layer and Declarative Secrets Handling for .NET Ecosystem
redb 3.4.0 introduces four major capabilities aimed at the day-after-deployment phase of running integration routes on .NET. The ecosystem comprises typed storage redb on top of Postgres, MSSQL and SQLite, the integration engine redb.Route that provides more than thirty connectors modeled on Apache Camel, the redb.Tsak runtime with dashboard, hot-reload and clustering, and redb.Identity implementing OIDC and OAuth 2.1.
The first feature, replay checkpoints, lets developers mark safe points inside a route using the Replayable DSL method. When a downstream step fails, the exchange snapshot captured at the last checkpoint can be replayed without re-executing earlier side effects such as card charges. The mechanism relies on a new IExchange.Snapshot primitive that performs a deep isolated copy, avoiding the shared-body behavior of the existing Clone method used by splitters.
Failed exchanges that carried a checkpoint are automatically placed into a dead-letter queue table. Operators can list, replay or discard these exchanges through the dashboard, REST API or CLI commands. Retention is handled by a standard cron route rather than an internal timer.
The second major change separates the framework assemblies into a Libs/shared directory. Early bootstrap code installs a custom assembly resolver so that redb.Core, providers and connectors are loaded from the shared location. Replacing a single DLL now patches the running system without rebuilding Tsak archives or container images. Version checks ensure that only patch-level differences between the shared layer and the host are permitted.
Secret handling has been moved from heuristic lists to declarative attributes. Endpoint option properties marked with [Sensitive] are automatically redacted by EndpointUri.Sanitize before any logging, OpenTelemetry tagging or health-check output occurs. All thirty-seven credential-bearing options across twenty-two connectors have been annotated.
Finally, the runtime now enforces role-based access on management APIs, records persistent audit events and verifies cryptographic signatures on modules loaded at runtime. redb.Identity has adopted the common ecosystem version number so that compatibility questions are answered by a single version digit.
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