Flying Eagle Android Trojan Turns Devices into Remote Surveillance Tools
Researchers from Hunt.io have dissected the Flying Eagle Android trojan, which is distributed under the guise of applications from the Bureau of Public Security. Victims are lured into installing an APK from counterfeit websites such as 110gongan[.]com and then granting it access to Accessibility Services. Once permissions are obtained, the smartphone effectively changes hands to the attackers.
The trojan records keystrokes, captures screenshots, displays phishing overlays on top of banking and government applications, reads SMS messages, and activates the camera and microphone. Through the Android API dispatchGesture, operators can remotely press buttons and fully control the device interface. Flying Eagle is not a single piece of malware but an entire surveillance factory. Attackers use a unified panel to assemble APKs with required phishing templates, manage compromised smartphones, and receive stolen data. One discovered server showed 46 victims, 29 of which remained online.
The builder can rename packages and classes, insert junk data to evade antivirus detection, and encrypt communication with the command server. Individual components carry descriptive names: LiveKeysStrok handles keylogging, ScreenCaps manages screen captures, and Webjector generates fake forms. Traces also link the platform to the SpyNote family. Over 30 days, researchers identified at least 170 active Flying Eagle servers, most located in Hong Kong, with additional nodes in the United States, Canada, Finland, Malaysia, and Japan.
Following the source code leak in February 2026, the trojan spread widely. On Telegram, builds are sold for approximately 2000 USDT, phishing templates are distributed, and stolen funds can be cashed out for a commission of up to 50 percent. A successor called Night Dragon is already in development, featuring a black screen mode, automatic hiding capabilities, and data theft targeting Alipay, WeChat, banking applications, and cryptocurrency wallets. The old eagle continues to fly while the new dragon has already been released to hunt.
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