Russian Ministry Proposes Mandatory Phone-Number Authentication for Foreign Websites and Apps
The Russian Ministry of Digital Development (MinTsifry) has put forward a proposal that would force foreign websites and mobile applications to authenticate users inside Russia solely by mobile-phone number. Traditional login methods such as email or social-network accounts could be removed under the new rules.
The requirement appears in the draft third package of anti-fraud measures titled Antifraud 3.0, according to business daily Vedomosti. In addition to phone-based authentication, owners of overseas resources would have to store registration data, login records and account-deletion information for three years and supply these records to Russian law-enforcement bodies on request.
The changes are intended to be introduced into Article 8 of the federal law On Information. The draft is currently undergoing inter-agency coordination; the government aims to submit the full legislative package to the State Duma in autumn 2026.
Industry observers note that international companies may be reluctant to redesign their authentication systems for a single market. They would need to identify Russian users and implement a separate login flow, an effort some services may decide is not worth the cost. As a result, certain platforms could withdraw from Russia, while some users may choose not to register at all if a phone number is mandatory.
A further complication concerns the definition of a foreign resource operating in Russia. Services such as Facebook and Instagram, both owned by Meta, have already been blocked and declared extremist organisations; their legal operation in the country has ceased, making enforcement of the new obligations practically difficult.
Antifraud 3.0 contains additional provisions, including a ban on disclosing the recipient’s personal data in SMS messages and an expansion of the data sets that telecommunications operators must retain for three years and disclose to special services.
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