Malicious npm Packages Deploy Multi-Stage Trojan with Embedded GitLab Keys
Researchers at Positive Technologies have detailed a months-long campaign in which an attacker uploaded trojanized packages to the npm registry from five accounts: alex05255, mdrafiqulislamrabby, b.w1001, abdev8773 and mollspotwood54400.
The malicious packages are: svg-fetcher, tradepilot, polytrade, polymarket-kit, react-svg-chunk, gamified-trading-system, font-huge, font-hub, mdb-vite, router-processor and route-processor.
The first-stage code is lightly obfuscated and contains verbose explanatory comments that reveal its logic. It assembles the command-and-control address from multiple string constants and requests the next stage from http://svganchordev.net/icons/<token>, sending the value logo in the bearrtoken header.
Known stage versions are 106, 107, 108 and 116. The second stage is delivered as a single heavily obfuscated JavaScript line that, once formatted, collects the current username, computer name and operating-system details before opening a WebSocket connection to receive further commands.
Stages 106 and 116 contain an additional surprise: hardcoded public and private keys for a private GitLab instance hosted in the attacker’s own infrastructure. Although the keys cannot be used against external systems, their presence indicates that the actor maintains a CI/CD pipeline to automate obfuscation and publication of new stages.
Positive Technologies has reported all malicious packages to npm administrators and recommends that development teams integrate automated feeds from PT Fusion to detect supply-chain threats before they reach production environments.
Related articles
NEC Subcontractor Suffers Cyber Attack Leading to Customer System Disruptions and Personal Data Leak
NEC disclosed that a subcontractor handling system development and maintenance was compromised in a cyber attack during late September 2026. Attackers stole legitimate account credentials and used them to access multiple customer environments from the subcontractor's systems. The intrusion resulted in server files being encrypted, rendering customer systems inoperable. Additional files containing personal information and system details were exfiltrated from a shared cloud storage platform used for coordination between NEC, the subcontractor, and customers. Affected customers have been notified individually, with further details on compromised personal data to be provided as they become available. The incident highlights risks associated with third-party vendor access in IT supply chains.
OVHcloud CLI Compromised: Infostealer Distributed Through Hijacked GitHub Releases for 25 Minutes
On October 19, the official OVHcloud CLI tool was compromised when an attacker used a hijacked developer account to replace binaries in five existing releases from v0.11.0 to v0.15.0. The attack lasted from 15:47 to 16:12 Moscow time, with the infostealer targeting API keys, SSH keys, and other secrets stored on developer and CI machines. The malicious binaries were uploaded directly via the GitHub Releases API, and the checksums.txt file was also replaced to match the tampered archives. Only users who had hardcoded the original SHA-256 hash in their CI pipelines, such as one customer who opened issue #300, detected the tampering when builds failed. The compromised account HassenBF had been infected with GlassWorm malware since March 2025, allowing persistent access until the October attack. OVH responded by deleting the malicious files at 17:21 and releasing v0.16.0 with immutable releases and attestation enabled.
Supply Chain Attacks Target Ledger Hardware Wallets with Evolving Backdoors
Ledger disclosed that sophisticated hardware backdoors discovered in multiple Nano X, Flex, and Stax devices enabled thieves to steal approximately 102 million dollars in cryptocurrency from roughly 315 accounts. The implants, initially found by hardware hacker Joe Grand in devices sold by unauthorized Southeast Asian sellers, have since appeared in units purchased from authorized resellers CryptoBilis and MediaMarkt. Later versions analyzed by Mark Karpeles feature custom flexible PCBs, LTE modules, and antennas engineered to intercept seed phrases and exfiltrate them over cellular networks. Evidence now points to deliberate compromise of the authorized supply chain rather than isolated tampering of returned units. Ledger has urged resellers to purchase only through verified channels and has suspended sales through CryptoBilis pending investigation, while users continue to report additional compromised devices across Europe.
Audit of 25 Package Managers Shows Only Two Verify Every Package's Integrity Against Compromised Repositories
A comprehensive test by Trail of Bits examined 25 popular package managers to determine whether they detect malicious code substituted by a compromised repository. The study found that fewer than half verify package integrity by default using lockfiles, and only two managers check the cryptographic hash of every downloaded package. Most managers either require manual configuration, use hashes insecurely, or lack any integrity checks even when lockfiles are present. Signature verification is even rarer, with only Go performing checks by default. The research used a Docker and mitmproxy testbed to simulate attacks while preserving realistic conditions. Results highlight significant gaps in supply-chain protections across ecosystems including JavaScript, Python, Ruby, Rust, and others. The findings also discuss limitations of current lockfile designs and emerging improvements in several communities.