Developer Builds Decentralized Messenger to Navigate Russian Laws 149-FZ and 152-FZ
A solo developer has released Gram, a lightweight messenger built entirely alone using the $mol framework and HyperBaza technology. The application enables encrypted messaging without logins, passwords, or any personal data collection and is intended only for home or personal use.
The project serves as a practical case study of Russian Federal Law 149-FZ, which defines an instant messaging service organizer as any entity providing systems for exchanging electronic messages where the sender selects the recipient and no public information is hosted. The developer notes that Gram can function offline, does not guarantee instant delivery, and performs all decryption exclusively on user devices.
Key features include direct dialogs by known ID, creation of invite-only conversations, and public registries that users can join voluntarily. All correspondence is end-to-end encrypted via HyperBaza, while push notifications cannot access message content. A built-in proof-of-work mechanism requires CPU effort for each message to deter spam bots.
Under 152-FZ on personal data, the application collects nothing, so no obligations arise. However, 149-FZ obligations fall on whoever operates public HyperBaza nodes because those nodes handle message relay without decryption. The law explicitly exempts citizens acting for personal, family, or household needs, allowing private use but requiring public nodes to be disabled.
The application cannot technically satisfy several legal requirements: identifying users by phone number, providing decryption keys, or storing readable message content for six months. Source code is published on GitHub, and users outside Russian jurisdiction may run their own nodes on gh-pages or local instances.
Metadata such as sender, recipient, and timestamps remains visible on servers. Due to the decentralized architecture, revocation of access to old messages in group chats is impossible. A poll on the original post showed most respondents believe the public node operator would be considered the organizer of information distribution.
Related articles
MinTsifry Proposes Requiring Telecom Operators to Install SORM Equipment Before Obtaining Licenses
The Russian Ministry of Digital Development plans to introduce legislation obligating telecom operators to deploy SORM surveillance systems prior to receiving operating licenses. Under the proposed rules, companies will only be permitted to begin serving subscribers after the equipment has been installed and handed over to law enforcement agencies. Non-compliance could result in license revocation through an extrajudicial administrative process. Current regulations allow operators to obtain licenses with a network diagram that merely indicates planned or existing SORM components. The change aims to close loopholes exploited by unscrupulous providers that repeatedly register new legal entities to operate without surveillance capabilities. Industry experts note that the minimum cost of a basic SORM complex starts at 5 million rubles, which could disproportionately affect smaller local providers without a transition period or scaled requirements.
GOST R 57580 Compliance: Defining Assessment Scope to Verify Real Protection in Financial Organizations
Financial institutions often maintain extensive documentation on information security yet still fail GOST R 57580 assessments due to mismatches between documented processes and actual infrastructure. The standards GOST R 57580.1-2017 and GOST R 57580.2-2018 set distinct requirements for protection levels and evaluation methodology. Correct application begins with identifying the organization's regulatory category under Bank of Russia rules such as Regulation 851-P for credit institutions or Regulation 757-P for non-credit financial organizations. Defining the precise assessment boundary is critical, including systems, remote access channels, virtualization components, and third-party interactions. Organizations must also distinguish between the full assessment scope and the representative sample selected for verification. Evidence collection requires both policy review and technical confirmation that controls function as intended across the evaluated environment.
Evaluating Secure Development Maturity: Comparing BSIMM, DSOMM, SAMM and GOST R 56939-2024
A detailed analysis compares four methodologies for self-assessing secure software development maturity in Russian companies. The review covers BSIMM from Black Duck, OWASP DSOMM, OWASP SAMM and the updated Russian national standard GOST R 56939-2024. Each model was tested through a simulated audit on a fictional company called ООО «Лиса и лосЬ» that uses GitLab, Nexus and SonarQube. The evaluation scored the methodologies on criteria including ease of maturity calculation, recommendation generation, roadmap building, heat-map creation and SDLC coverage. GOST R 56939-2024 and SAMM received the highest total scores of 35 and 34 out of 47. The article concludes that no single methodology covers all needs and recommends combining approaches tailored to specific company contexts.
GlobalSign Launches New Wave of SSL/TLS Certificate Revocations Targeting Russian Organizations
GlobalSign has initiated another round of revocations affecting SSL/TLS certificates issued to Russian websites, with a total of 11,000 certificates withdrawn from 1,300 organizations so far. The revocations primarily impact entities listed in EU and US sanctions regimes, in line with updated CA/Browser Forum requirements that took effect in May 2026. Greek CA HARICA has also participated in the revocations, sometimes completing the process within seconds and leaving site owners little time to respond. The actions stem from mandatory checks against the OFAC SDN List, BIS Denied Persons List, and equivalent European sanctions databases. Russian authorities recommend obtaining domestic TLS certificates via Gosuslugi within three business days to maintain secure access in foreign browsers. Let's Encrypt has similarly updated its policies to restrict certificates for sanctioned Russian entities while continuing issuance for others.