Chrome Adds On-Device Gemini Nano While Ask Gemini Sends Page Content to Google Cloud
Google has added an AI on device toggle in Chrome settings that activates models running directly on the user's computer. The change supports several use cases, including detection of fraudulent websites. Several gigabytes of Gemini Nano weights now reside in the browser profile directory and execute on CPU or GPU.
Users might expect the downloaded model to power local features such as reading and summarizing the current page without cloud calls. However, Google chose a different approach. The company operates two separate systems under the single name Gemini.
Two Gemini Systems
Ask Gemini / Gemini in Chrome is a cloud service. When a user requests a summary or answers based on open tabs, the page content is sent to Google infrastructure. Gemini Nano is the local model downloaded by Chrome and invoked only through specialized browser APIs by websites, extensions, or the browser itself for initial checks.
- Ask Gemini / Gemini in Chrome – runs in Google cloud, invoked by the user
- Gemini Nano via built-in APIs – runs on the computer, invoked by sites and extensions
- Gemini Nano in Safe Browsing – performs primary analysis locally, invoked by Chrome
In the last case the model itself operates locally, yet with Enhanced Protection enabled its analysis results may be forwarded to Google Safe Browsing.
The Ask Gemini button in the interface triggers the cloud service. Page content and URLs are temporarily stored in the user's Google account, and with history saving enabled they appear in Gemini activity logs. Up to ten additional tabs shared by the user may also be processed in the cloud.
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