Bypassing Blocks, Privacy, and Anonymity Remain Separate Challenges for Decentralized Networks
The developers behind the decentralized network Tunnel Cat have published a detailed clarification stating that bypassing internet blocks, protecting privacy, and ensuring anonymity are fundamentally different technical tasks.
In a follow-up to an earlier post about AmneziaWG, the team explains why even a working decentralized system cannot automatically deliver privacy or anonymity. Transport encryption uses standard TLS, which prevents individual nodes from reading passing traffic. However, this protection is limited to the channel and does not replace end-to-end encryption of the actual messages or calls.
The architecture routes traffic through many independent client devices located in different jurisdictions. Because no single operator controls every hop, the project cannot offer assurances about every participant in the path. Consequently, Tunnel Cat does not claim to protect the content of conversations.
Practical recommendations
The authors advise users to separate concerns:
- Use messengers with verified end-to-end encryption such as Signal or Matrix for actual communication.
- Avoid relying on Telegram for sensitive discussions, noting that its server-side code is closed and default chats lack E2E protection.
They are developing their own messenger, Ratatoshk, on top of the same network precisely because circumvention and private messaging require independent security audits.
Logging and identifiability
Tunnel Cat retains operational event logs that record metadata about connections and blocked resources. These logs exist for two stated reasons: to demonstrate compliance with local laws regarding serious crimes and to obtain real-time data on blocking techniques inside Russia. The team acknowledges that this telemetry prevents the system from being considered an anonymity tool.
The post concludes that attempting to solve circumvention, privacy, and anonymity with a single product usually weakens all three guarantees. Users seeking strong anonymity are directed to specialized solutions such as Tor instead of depending on Tunnel Cat.
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