Armored Likho Expands Arsenal with BusySnake RAT and AI-Driven Malware Development
The cybercrime group Armored Likho has significantly expanded its offensive capabilities by deploying a new multi-platform remote access trojan named BusySnake RAT. The malware is designed to compromise systems running Windows, Linux, and macOS, giving operators cross-platform control over infected endpoints.
Experts from Kaspersky Lab have identified three distinct iterations of BusySnake RAT. The initial version was written in Python and relied on Telegram bot infrastructure for command-and-control communications. Subsequent updates migrated the infrastructure to GitLab, while the most recent variant has been completely rewritten in Go for improved performance and stealth.
Besides its custom tooling, Armored Likho has begun integrating the open-source Kharon RAT into its operations. This component enables attackers to establish remote access to compromised devices and exfiltrate selected files.
The group has also modified its distribution infrastructure. Instead of using publicly accessible repositories, operators now host components in private projects on GitHub and GitLab. This change complicates network traffic analysis and helps conceal the full set of deployed tools for longer periods.
A notable evolution involves the group’s use of generative AI. Previously, large language models were employed mainly during the initial intrusion phase. Current code analysis indicates that Armored Likho now uses these models to create additional utilities for persistence and further attack development.
Full technical details of the campaign are available in a Kaspersky report published on Securelist. Protective solutions from Kaspersky Lab detect and block activity associated with the group.
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