Russia Authorizes Temporary State Takeover of Unprotected Critical Infrastructure
Owners of critical infrastructure who fail to implement proper protection measures now face the risk of temporarily losing control over their assets. President Vladimir Putin has signed a decree introducing new security measures for critical infrastructure objects, granting the government authority to appoint a temporary manager in such cases.
The decree establishes a clear procedure for intervention when operators do not meet required security standards. The appointed temporary administrator will assume management responsibilities for the affected facilities, ensuring operational continuity while security deficiencies are addressed. This mechanism applies specifically to assets designated as critical infrastructure whose inadequate protection could pose risks to national interests.
Officials emphasize that the measure is designed as a temporary safeguard rather than a permanent transfer of ownership. Once the necessary security improvements are verified, control is expected to return to the original owners. The policy targets sectors where lapses in protection could lead to significant operational or safety consequences.
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