Russian ISPs Begin Disrupting Encrypted DNS Services from Google and Cloudflare
Users of several major Russian internet providers have reported widespread issues accessing encrypted DNS protocols offered by Google and Cloudflare. The affected services include DNS over HTTPS (DoH) and DNS over TLS (DoT), which encrypt DNS queries and prevent providers from easily monitoring which domains users are visiting.
Measurements indicate that the filtering operates in a sophisticated manner. TCP connections are established successfully, but the secure tunnel is disrupted at the next stage. When connecting to Cloudflare addresses 1.1.1.1 and 1.0.0.1 on port 853, the TCP handshake completes, after which the connection is forcibly reset with an ECONNRESET error before TLS authentication finishes.
Google Public DNS shows a different pattern. Connections to dns.google, 8.8.8.8, and 8.8.4.4 on port 443 are established, yet after the TLS ClientHello is sent, responses stop. Sessions either hang until timeout or end with an "unexpected eof while reading" error. This behavior points to interference by intermediate network equipment using signature-based filtering.
The problems have affected subscribers of Rostelecom, Dom.ru, Tattelecom, and St. Petersburg-based SkyNet. Symptoms vary by operator and region: some users lose only DoT, others lose DoH, and some experience both protocols blocked. Tattelecom technical support reportedly advised one customer to disable both protocols to regain access.
Although no official statement confirming centralized blocking has been released, the simultaneous occurrence of identical issues across multiple providers and both major public DNS services makes random failure highly unlikely.
Related articles
Hydrat Project Builds Automated WireGuard Gateway for Resilient VLESS and Tor Routing
A developer has released Hydrat, a self-hosted gateway that connects devices via WireGuard while automatically managing VLESS and Tor backends to survive server blocks and quality degradation. The system maintains a pool of tested proxies, performs continuous health checks, and switches routes without requiring client-side profile changes. Two Go processes handle control logic and network enforcement separately, using SQLite for state and nftables plus Xray for traffic routing. TCP and UDP can be assigned independent exits, with geoip.dat support and custom rules to keep marketplace apps functional. The project emphasizes stability over direct connections and is designed for deployment on servers in Russian jurisdiction.
OpenAI Contractors Manually Review Real User Chats in Project Lily
OpenAI has engaged hundreds of external contractors to analyze actual user conversations with ChatGPT as part of its model improvement efforts. The reviewers, working under project Lily, examine real queries that may contain personal, medical, or other sensitive information despite the use of a Privacy Filter. Contractors summarize prompts, compare four model responses, and assign ratings from one to seven while flagging behaviors such as excessive sycophancy or inappropriate emojis. User identities are hidden and some data is filtered, yet OpenAI acknowledged that not all personal information is reliably removed. The same human review process is also employed by Anthropic for its Claude model. Users can opt out of future training use through account settings, although prior data remains unaffected.
UDP Proxies and QUIC Protocol: How Real IP Addresses Leak Through Anti-Detect Browsers
Anti-detect browser users relying on UDP-capable proxies face a hidden risk of real IP leakage when the browser fails to properly route UDP traffic. The QUIC protocol, which powers HTTP/3, runs over UDP and enables features like 0-RTT handshakes, independent streams, and connection migration that can bypass proxy routes. WebRTC connections using ICE, STUN, and TURN further increase exposure because they often attempt direct UDP paths outside the configured SOCKS5 proxy. Without deep network stack control such as TUN interfaces or socket interception, browsers may send WebRTC and QUIC packets through the host's real network interface. Aurorium Browser claims to solve this by natively supporting UDP proxying so that both QUIC and WebRTC traffic stays inside the tunnel. The article stresses that simply disabling WebRTC or forcing HTTP/2 fallback is insufficient and can itself create detectable anomalies for anti-fraud systems.
Google to Offer Granular Controls for Advanced Protection Mode in Android 16
Google is preparing more flexible settings for its Advanced Protection security mode that first appeared in Android 16. The changes were discovered by Android Authority researchers while examining Google Play Services version 26.36.30. A new Expert features section will let users enable individual protections such as USB Protection, intrusion detection logging, and restrictions on unsafe Wi-Fi networks without activating the entire strict mode. USB Protection blocks new USB connections while the screen is locked to prevent physical attacks, though it can interfere with fast charging on Pixel 6 and newer devices. Users will also be able to opt out of automatic connections to open or risky Wi-Fi networks if they regularly use public hotspots. Intrusion Logging remains optional and stores encrypted security logs in the cloud. The update aims to preserve core security benefits while removing the all-or-nothing requirement of the current Advanced Protection implementation.