VC.ru Blocks Lawyer's Account After Article Exposing In-Platform Phishing Scheme
A lawyer writing under the name David Zamirovich on VC.ru since 2022 had his account blocked shortly after publishing material about a phishing campaign operating through articles on the platform itself.
The original trigger was a report on Habr describing how a victim lost 10k USDT after interacting with malicious links. Zamirovich summarized the attack pattern without naming individuals or posting unredacted screenshots.
The phishing mechanism relied on publishing normal-looking articles that passed moderation and gained search visibility. Attackers later replaced internal links with redirects through intermediaries that led to cloned services. Users connecting wallets and signing verification transactions lost funds.
Zamirovich's article focused on defensive advice and referenced the existing Habr analysis. One hour after publication the account received an automated notice citing violation of rule 5 concerning creation of additional accounts to bypass restrictions.
The author had never operated secondary accounts. He sent formal requests under Article 14 of 152-FZ for disclosure of personal data processing and a consumer-protection claim demanding account restoration and precise reasons for the block.
Support initially claimed an automated system had detected IP overlap with previously banned accounts. The account was restored the same day. Shortly afterward the platform changed the account type to commercial, requiring a monthly payment of 56,000 rubles for search indexing.
After additional legal correspondence the platform reversed the commercial classification on 26 August and restored normal user status. Zamirovich continues to document the case on his Telegram channel Lawyer without bugs.
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