telEgo Combines MTProxy and WEB Proxy on Single Port 443 with TLS Fronting
telEgo is a fast Telegram proxy written in Go that leverages the gnet library for epoll and kqueue-based networking. In its latest release, the tool added support for all four WEB proxy transport modes while continuing to handle classic MTProxy traffic.
Telegram Desktop can now connect through WEB proxies. From the outside, the connection appears as ordinary HTTPS traffic to a website, which then serves as the transport between the client and the proxy.
How MTProxy and WEB Share Port 443
The architecture keeps only one public listener on port 443. telEgo inspects incoming connections: valid MTProxy handshakes are handled directly, while regular TLS sessions are spliced to Nginx on private port 8443 using PROXY protocol v2. Nginx terminates the real TLS certificate, serves the website, and forwards authenticated WEB carrier requests to the internal telEgo WEB listener on port 8080.
Four carrier modes are available: https, https-lanes, websocket, and websocket-lanes. The https-lanes mode uses separate HTTP/2 channels per Telegram stream, while websocket-lanes creates an individual WebSocket per stream.
Deployment with Docker Compose
The example repository provides docker-compose.yml, telego.toml, and an Nginx configuration. Users generate a base secret with the Docker image, configure the [web-proxy] section, obtain a Let's Encrypt certificate via standalone mode, and start the stack. Only port 443 is exposed publicly for telEgo.
Existing ee and dd MTProxy links remain valid. WEB links are generated automatically from the same secret and can be added directly in Telegram Desktop.
The setup requires a VPS with open ports 80 and 443, a domain with an A record, and Docker with Compose. When an existing Nginx instance is present, its server blocks must be adapted to listen on private ports only.
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