SecuritylabAugust 28, 2026🇷🇺Translated from Russian

Step-by-Step Guide to Removing Personal Data from Search Engines, Databases and Social Networks

The article opens by describing how entering a phone number in quotes, followed by formatted variants such as 8 (999) 123-45-67, and old email addresses quickly reveals scattered personal data across the internet. The guide is structured as a checklist rather than theory, supplying exact buttons to click, wording for letters, statutory deadlines, and escalation procedures when requests are refused.

Plan on seven steps and calendar

The recommended sequence begins with an audit to build a list of URLs, followed by contacting the original source, then search engines, social networks, phone directories, maps, and finally archives. The first week is allocated to auditing and sending letters, weeks two and three to waiting plus social media and directory work, week four to search engine requests, and month two to complaints with Roskomnadzor for non-responsive operators.

Step 1. 20-minute audit

Users are instructed to create a spreadsheet tracking every URL, the personal data displayed, the recipient contacted, date sent, and reply received. Search queries should include full name variations, maiden names, city combinations, four phone formats, every historical email address, and old forum nicknames. The same queries must be run in both Yandex and Google, including image search. Additional checks cover Have I Been Pwned for breach history, caller-ID apps, the Roskomnadzor register of personal-data operators, and email inboxes for forgotten registrations.

Step 2. Source site and letter template

Contact details are located in “Contacts”, “About us”, privacy policies, or WHOIS records. Letters should be sent via email, web form, and messenger simultaneously. The template cites 152-FZ, lists exact URLs and data fields, demands cessation of processing and deletion within statutory timeframes, and warns of escalation to Roskomnadzor. Screenshots of every page and message are required for later complaints.

Step 3. Search engines Yandex and Google

Yandex accepts 10.3-law requests through its feedback form and processes them within ten working days. Google offers both the Russian legal route and its global “Results about you” tool, which now covers passport and driver-license numbers. Quick removal of already-deleted pages is available via the three-dot menu. The right to be forgotten applies only to name-based queries; direct links remain accessible.

Step 4. Social networks, messengers, old accounts

Visibility settings for phone numbers, birth dates, and indexing must be disabled first. Accounts should be fully deleted rather than deactivated. When login access is lost, the same 152-FZ request applies. Photographs published without consent can be removed under Article 152.1 of the Civil Code except in cases of public interest or paid posing.

Step 5–7. Phone numbers, directories, archives

Old listings on classifieds, food-delivery profiles, and review sites are removed through account settings or support tickets. Map services such as 2GIS require identity verification. Web-archive removal requests go to info@archive.org and succeed only with copyright or proven-harm arguments. Leaked databases cannot be erased; mitigation relies on changing numbers, using separate registration emails, enabling two-factor authentication, and activating credit self-bans via Gosuslugi.

Roskomnadzor and courts

Complaints are filed when operators ignore deadlines, refuse without legal basis, or lack contact information. The regulator has 30 days to respond and may issue orders or restrict access. Court action remains a last resort with lower practical impact due to modest fines.

Maintenance and realistic expectations

A full audit should be repeated after one month and then quarterly. The realistic goal is clearing the first page of search results for phone, address, and daily routine data rather than total disappearance from the internet.

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