安全客August 28, 2026🇨🇳Translated from Chinese

Volcano Engine Releases Intelligent Agent Security Capability Map for Enterprise AI Deployments

Volcano Engine has released the Intelligent Agent Security Capability Map, offering enterprises a structured framework for securing AI agents at scale. The announcement comes as organizations move beyond pilot projects into widespread deployment of diverse, heterogeneous agents that are now deeply integrated into core production systems and office workflows.

This integration is reshaping traditional IT architectures and dramatically increasing security risks. In response, ByteDance internal best practices have been distilled into a comprehensive map covering 10 capability dimensions and 60 technical elements. The scope explicitly includes WorkFlow agents, office agents, and AI Coding agents.

Ten Core Security Capabilities

The map details the following controls: 01 Intelligent Agent Compliance Admission with role-based classification and security baseline files; 02 Intelligent Agent Asset and Supply Chain Security using AI-BOM inventories and periodic supply-chain scans; 03 Content Security Compliance for real-time detection, red-line topic blocking, and AI-generated content labeling; 04 Regular Security Assessment and Hardening through compliance and red-team testing with remediation guidance.

05 AI Security Gateway provides unified ingress, sensitive-data identification, cross-border controls, model routing, and resource-exhaustion protection; 06 Identity and Authentication Management establishes non-human identities, delegation chains, and intent statements linked to human users; 07 Permission and Access Control enforces dynamic, context-aware rules across user-to-subagent-to-tool delegation paths with mandatory human-in-the-loop for high-risk actions; 08 Runtime Security Monitoring and Protection detects tool abuse, memory poisoning, and injection attacks with customizable policies.

09 Security Observability and Operations Management builds UEBA and AEBA baselines for long-term behavioral auditing and automated response; 10 Model and Inference Security delivers confidential computing with chip-rooted trust, end-to-end encryption, and remote attestation.

Three-Stage Implementation Roadmap

Volcano Engine recommends a phased approach. L1 focuses on basic AI security protection through admission, asset management, content compliance, and assessment to establish a safe baseline. L2 adds fine-grained control via the security gateway, identity management, access controls, and runtime protection. L3 enables continuous operations through observability, UEBA/AEBA analytics, and confidential inference protection for mission-critical environments.

The framework aims to create an integrated security system for both employees and agents, delivering trustworthy, controllable, and manageable AI deployments.

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