Backblaze Responds in Minutes While reg.ru Delays Action on Banking Trojan Infrastructure

A detailed reverse-engineering report reveals a sophisticated Android banking Trojan distributed via Telegram spam that disables antivirus apps, intercepts SMS one-time codes, and exfiltrates banking credentials. The malware uses AES-encrypted assets, a custom binary protocol over sockets, and multiple modules for screen streaming, keylogging, microphone access, and remote control. Infrastructure analysis traced the payload to an S3-compatible bucket on Backblaze, four command-and-control domains, and a VPS, with the domains registered through reg.ru. Notifications sent to Backblaze resulted in account termination within 11 minutes, while reg.ru responded only after a week with a statement refusing action without a court order. The same signing certificate appears across multiple variants, allowing rapid infrastructure rotation that keeps the campaign active despite takedown attempts. Kaspersky and CERT teams were also notified but produced no visible results within the observed period.

HabrTranslated from Russian

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A researcher who encountered spam messages promoting a fake VPN application in Telegram chats spent a week analyzing the resulting Android Trojan and documenting how different hosting providers responded to abuse reports.

The malware begins as a heavily obfuscated dropper that requests accessibility services, then installs a second-stage payload retrieved from an S3 bucket hosted on Backblaze. Once active, the Trojan disables network access for security applications including Kaspersky products, Samsung security services, and Google Play Services by routing their traffic through a short-lived VPN tunnel.

Capabilities extracted from the decrypted payload include interception of banking SMS codes, real-time screen streaming via MediaProjection, keylogging, remote camera and microphone access, contact and file theft, and the ability to grant itself additional permissions through accessibility services. The sample also contains routines to hide from the app drawer and resist uninstallation.

Command-and-control traffic is directed to four domains registered through reg.ru. WHOIS records show the domains were created in August 2026 with a two-year registration term and point to a VPS used for data exfiltration. The researcher notified Backblaze, reg.ru, Kaspersky, and Russian CERT channels shortly after discovering the infrastructure.

Backblaze terminated the implicated account within eleven minutes of the report. In contrast, reg.ru replied after nearly a week, stating that it would act only upon a court decision or an official request from an authorized body. No visible action was taken by the Russian registrar or CERT during the observation period, allowing the operators to continue rotating payloads to new buckets and servers.

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