Habr•September 1, 2026•🇷🇺Translated from Russian

FSTEC Order 60 Expands Attestation Rules to Municipal Systems, Defense Industry and Personal Data Operators

Russian regulators have significantly widened the circle of organizations required to perform attestation of information systems starting 1 September 2026. The key document, FSTEC Order No. 60 of 27 February 2026, amends the earlier FSTEC Order No. 77 of 29 April 2021 and changes the very definition of entities covered by the attestation procedure.

The updated rules now explicitly apply to state and municipal information systems, including municipal personal data systems; industrial control systems at defense-industry organizations, including CNC machine tools; and protected premises used for confidential negotiations. The order also covers any information systems belonging to state bodies, state unitary enterprises or state institutions that are not formally classified as state systems, as well as critical information infrastructure objects, non-state personal data operators and industrial control systems at critically important or potentially hazardous facilities.

Two new articles introduce concrete control methods. Article 31¹ states that post-attestation monitoring must include vulnerability analysis and penetration testing. Article 16¹ makes penetration testing mandatory for state information systems and other systems of state bodies, unitary enterprises and institutions that have first or second protection class and are connected to the internet or interact with external systems, with the sole exception of encrypted VPN channels using certified cryptographic means.

Reporting deadlines have also changed. Article 32 now requires submission of control results to FSTEC at least once every three years and no later than five working days after completion of the control. Failure to meet the deadline can lead to suspension of the attestation certificate. Only organizations holding an FSTEC license that explicitly includes rights to conduct attestation tests and protection control against unauthorized access may perform the work.

A second document, FSB Order No. 297 of 6 August 2026, implements new incident-reporting obligations for every state institution under the amended Article 16 of Federal Law 149-FZ. Each school, hospital or other state-funded body must independently conclude an interaction regulation with NKTSKI, obtain a personal cabinet and transmit information about incidents within 24 hours. Three separate 24-hour clocks apply to incident reporting, confirmation of receipt and notification of preventive measures.

Finally, Government Decree No. 1024 allows the use of Russian-hosted cloud services for state systems provided the service meets or exceeds the required protection class, yet places full compliance responsibility on the heads of the user organizations. All three regulatory acts enter into force on 1 September 2026.

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