Russia Starts Blocking Encrypted DNS Protocols DoH and DoT Across Major ISPs
Since mid-August 2026, subscribers of Rostelecom, Dom.ru, Tattelecom, SkyNet and Beeline have experienced complete loss of connectivity to encrypted DNS resolvers operated by Google and Cloudflare. The outages are not caused by network congestion or resolver failure; instead, connections are actively disrupted at the network level.
DoT traffic to port 853 is terminated with TCP RST packets immediately after the three-way handshake completes. DoH traffic to port 443 passes the TCP handshake but is dropped silently once the TLS ClientHello containing the SNI value dns.google or cloudflare-dns.com is observed. This selective behaviour demonstrates the use of deep packet inspection rather than simple port or IP blocking.
Simultaneously, unencrypted UDP DNS queries on port 53 are being redirected to the national domain-name system infrastructure known as NSIDI. The replacement resolver returns authoritative NXDOMAIN responses for blocked domains while supplying correct answers for all other names, making the manipulation invisible to applications that do not validate DNSSEC signatures.
Technical verification methods include checking the Authoritative Answer flag in responses, sending deliberately low-TTL queries to trigger ICMP Time Exceeded messages, and querying the diagnostic domain whoami.akamai.net to reveal the actual resolver IP address. These tests consistently show that traffic never reaches the intended public resolvers.
Existing circumvention techniques such as DNS over TCP, direct IP connections that avoid SNI inspection, and local tools like GoodbyeDPI or zapret provide only partial relief. The only reliable solution remains routing all traffic, including DNS, through an encrypted VPN tunnel that hides both destination addresses and query contents from the TSPU sensors.
Related articles
Why Split-Tunneling Leaks Persist in Android VPN Clients and How Work Profiles Provide a Fix
Popular Android VPN clients such as Happ, v2rayNG and Hiddify cannot reliably combine split-tunneling with a true kill-switch because of AOSP limitations in VpnService.Builder and netd. When the system Lockdown mode is enabled, applications excluded from the tunnel lose all connectivity; when it is disabled, any client crash, LMKD kill, network switch or boot delay allows traffic from apps like Claude to bypass the VPN and expose the real IP. Alternative approaches using full-tunnel plus Xray routing or AdGuard DNS plus SNI proxy also fail on Android due to QUIC, DoH, hidden telemetry domains and ConnectivityManager flags that break banking apps. Anthropic’s strict regional enforcement means a single leaked request can permanently ban a $200 Claude Max subscription with no refund. The only architecture that achieves fail-closed isolation places Claude and ChatGPT inside a dedicated Work Profile managed by Shelter and Pocket Android, where Profile Owner rights allow Always-on VPN plus Lockdown to be applied exclusively to user 10 while the main profile remains untouched.
Purism Announces Librem 5 v2 Smartphone on RISC-V with Hardware Kill Switches for Camera, Microphone and Connectivity
Purism has revealed the second-generation Librem 5 smartphone, marking a major shift from Arm to RISC-V architecture with the eight-core SpacemiT K1 processor. The device retains its core privacy focus through physical hardware switches that can disable the camera, microphone, GPS, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and cellular modem. Both the Wi-Fi/Bluetooth module and the modem are designed as removable cards, allowing users to replace or completely remove them, with future plans for 5G and NFC modules. Specifications include a 5.7-inch 1440x720 display, 13 MP and 8 MP cameras, a 4500 mAh removable battery, 8 GB RAM and 128 GB storage, dual SIM support, microSD slot and headphone jack. The phone runs PureOS with the Phosh shell based on GNOME and supports desktop mode when connected to an external monitor. Purism will not add fingerprint or facial recognition due to legal concerns in the United States, pricing the device at $1,599 with developer kits expected after a crowdfunding campaign.
Four VLESS VPN Configurations Show Varying Lifespans Before Network Restrictions
A Habr author under the nickname PXI published results from a private experiment involving four VPN stands running the VLESS protocol. The test compared REALITY and Self-SNI TLS setups, both directly and through an intermediate server located in Russia. One REALITY configuration with an intermediate server operated for four months until manually disabled by the author. Direct REALITY connections encountered restrictions after approximately three months. The two Self-SNI TLS stands became unavailable after eight days and three days respectively. In some cases IP accessibility later recovered, suggesting possible subnet-wide blocking. The author attributes detection to metadata analysis such as packet sizes, inter-packet intervals, connection duration and traffic direction ratios rather than confirmed active probing or machine learning by DPI systems.
Bye, Censor! Android App Routes Telegram and YouTube Through Local Proxy to Evade System VPN Detection
A Russian developer frustrated with music service censorship in Yandex Music and VK Music has released an open-source Android application called Bye, Censor! that provides selective proxy access instead of registering as a system-wide VPN. The tool uses the Xray core to run a password-protected SOCKS5 or HTTP proxy on localhost, allowing only configured applications such as Telegram, Firefox, and browsers to route traffic while leaving banking and other apps unaffected. The motivation stems from Android reporting VPN status to all applications, causing services to block functionality even when their own traffic does not traverse the VPN tunnel. Users must disable any system VPN, import a VLESS or VMess configuration link, and manually set proxy settings in Telegram and browser extensions such as Proxy Toggle. The application deliberately avoids system-level registration to prevent detection by apps that refuse to operate under VPN conditions. The author notes that the solution targets the most common use cases of browsing, messaging, and video streaming while accepting that other applications may remain subject to restrictions.