Securitylab•October 9, 2026•🇷🇺Translated from Russian

Why AI Detectors Cannot Be Trusted: The Shift to Watermarks and C2PA Standards

Detecting AI-generated images by examining fingers, teeth, or text has become ineffective as modern generators now produce realistic hands, photographic simulations, and synthetic voices. Visual or audio inspection therefore offers only grounds for suspicion rather than reliable proof. Manufacturers are shifting from post-factum detection to embedding machine-readable provenance signals directly into created files.

In 2026 the process accelerated sharply. From August 2 the European Union began enforcing Article 50 of the AI Act on AI-content transparency. Providers of generative systems must ensure machine-readable labeling of synthetic images, video, audio, and text, subject to defined exceptions. Against this regulatory backdrop Anthropic is rolling out watermarks in Claude, Google is expanding SynthID, OpenAI launched Verify, and native checkers appeared at Midjourney, Meta, and ElevenLabs.

No universal “check any file for any AI” button exists. OpenAI Verify primarily recognizes its own signals, Gemini searches for SynthID from Google models, Claude looks for its own signature, and Midjourney checks its proprietary mark. Even shared technology does not guarantee detector compatibility. Google explicitly warns that Gemini does not yet recognize SynthID from other vendors, although SynthID is already adopted by OpenAI, Apple, ElevenLabs, NVIDIA and others.

What can be detected inside a file

Modern verification systems rely on three fundamentally different mechanisms. The first involves C2PA and Content Credentials, which store cryptographically signed information about a file’s origin and editing history. The second mechanism is an invisible watermark embedded directly into the image, audio waveform, video, or statistical structure of text. The third mechanism uses statistical classifiers that analyze content without any pre-embedded marker and estimate similarity to known model outputs.

C2PA cannot be treated as a simple “made by AI” seal. The standard is also used by cameras, editors, and conventional publishing systems. A correctly signed C2PA record confirms provenance and integrity but says nothing about the truthfulness of the depicted scene. The C2PA consortium itself warns that origin data is not a fact-check.

Invisible watermarks such as Google SynthID, Meta Content Seal, and Anthropic text watermarks are designed to survive compression and resizing, yet no watermark is indestructible. Independent tests have already shown that aggressive cropping can defeat detection.

Statistical classifiers require no prior marker but remain probabilistic. They struggle especially with human-written text later edited by models. Modern detectors have improved, yet studies continue to record false positives, misses, and sharp score changes after minor editing.

Which services check what

The table of available tools illustrates the market’s core limitation: most official detectors answer only narrow questions such as “does this image contain an OpenAI signal?” rather than the broad question “was this file created by any AI?”

  • OpenAI Verify accepts images and audio and looks for C2PA plus SynthID from OpenAI; it does not detect other vendors.
  • Gemini checks images, video, and audio for SynthID Google and Content Credentials but does not recognize SynthID from other companies.
  • Claude Check Content searches for C2PA records from Claude and performs checks locally in the browser.
  • Midjourney Verify looks for a hidden Midjourney identifier that is easily lost after re-saving or social-media upload.
  • Content Credentials Verify reads any valid C2PA metadata across images, video, audio, and PDF.
  • ElevenLabs Audio Detector primarily searches for SynthID ElevenLabs and falls back to a classifier.
  • Meta Content Seal Detector checks images from Muse Image for the Content Seal watermark.

OpenAI Verify supports PNG, JPG, WebP, MP3, WAV and other formats up to defined size limits. Positive results indicate the file was created or processed with supported OpenAI tools. Negative results may simply mean an older file, removed metadata, or another generator was used.

Google integrated checking directly into Gemini. Authorized users can upload files up to 100 MB; video is limited to under 90 seconds and audio to under one hour. Gemini combines SynthID with Content Credentials and can highlight video segments containing the watermark.

Anthropic’s public Claude Check Content page accepts numerous image and audio formats up to 100 MB and performs verification locally. Text watermark detection for newer Claude models is available only through a closed Detection API for qualified organizations.

Midjourney Verify accepts PNG, JPEG, WebP, GIF and TIFF up to 20 MB without requiring an account. The company places a hidden identifier in every generated image, yet warns that screenshots and most social platforms remove the mark.

ElevenLabs Audio Detector first looks for SynthID and falls back to a classifier. Files created before June 2026 lack the new watermark.

Meta’s preliminary Content Seal Detector demonstrated both utility and weakness: Reuters testing showed that cropping images to roughly half or one-third of original area defeated detection in 55 percent of cases.

Apple, Stability AI, and Microsoft also participate in the SynthID or C2PA ecosystems. xAI uses a visible “Grok” label on generated images and video.

Text remains the hardest medium

Plain text files lose conventional metadata upon copying. Anthropic therefore embeds statistical watermarks directly into word selection for models released after August 2, 2026. Google has developed a textual variant of SynthID. Public cross-vendor text detectors still do not exist.

Services such as Pangram and GPTZero rely on statistical analysis. Results from different systems often diverge, mixed human-AI text is especially difficult, and minor editing can dramatically alter scores. A “96 percent AI” reading does not equal cryptographic proof that 96 percent of the words were written by ChatGPT.

How to check a suspicious file correctly

The most useful step is obtaining the original file rather than a screenshot or social-media copy. Recommended procedure:

  • Obtain the original file whenever possible.
  • Identify the suspected generator and test with its official checker first.
  • Check C2PA via Content Credentials Verify.
  • Compare multiple independent signals rather than averaging classifier percentages.
  • Never treat a negative result as conclusive proof of human origin.
  • Look outside the file: reverse image search, original publication date, EXIF data, and version history frequently reveal more than any detector.

The strongest evidence occurs when an original file contains both a trusted C2PA record from a specific vendor and a matching invisible watermark. Even then, the result does not prove content truthfulness, authorship, or the exact proportion of AI work.

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