FakeGit Campaign Floods GitHub with 7,600 Fake Repositories to Distribute SmartLoader Malware
The FakeGit campaign has turned GitHub into a massive storefront of deceptive repositories aimed at distributing SmartLoader, a loader designed to install follow-on malware such as the StealC infostealer. The operation, active at least until July 2026, has created or repurposed nearly 7,600 repositories and employs a sophisticated mix of cloned legitimate projects, realistic documentation, and fake developer profiles to appear trustworthy.
Visitors are guided to download ZIP archives from GitHub Releases, a channel often perceived as more reliable. Approximately 200 of these repositories have recorded more than 14 million downloads, demonstrating the campaign’s significant reach. In roughly 800 cases the repositories masquerade as AI-related utilities, specifically presented as Skills or MCP (Model Context Protocol) servers.
This approach enables the AgentBaiting technique, in which attackers do not need to send direct links; instead, they rely on AI agents searching for free skills or MCP servers and subsequently following installation instructions that execute malicious code. Internal tests have shown that systems including Anthropic Claude Code, Google Gemini, and OpenAI ChatGPT can surface malicious repositories during discovery.
The infection chain begins with the downloaded ZIP, which triggers a staged payload executed through LuaJIT and culminating in an obfuscated Lua script that installs SmartLoader. The loader maintains persistence on Windows via scheduled tasks and resolves its command-and-control infrastructure dynamically using a blockchain-based dead drop referencing a smart contract on Polygon.
Exposure is further amplified by more than 600 listings appearing on public directories such as LobeHub, Glama, MCP.so, and MCP Market. Organizations are recommended to avoid executing unverified ZIP files or scripts, maintain internal catalogs of approved AI components, apply application control policies, and monitor for LuaJIT execution and anomalous network activity including direct IP connections or Polygon RPC endpoints.
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