Habr•July 21, 2026•🇷🇺Translated from Russian

Advanced Windows Auditing Configuration Guide for Effective Incident Response in SOC Environments

When beginning work in a SOC (Security Operations Center), it quickly becomes clear that default Windows logging provides limited visibility into system activities. Events such as logons, process creation, and policy changes are either not recorded or appear in a heavily truncated form.

The service responsible for managing auditing is LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service), which runs at startup and resides in memory to handle user sessions, authentication requests, and protection of sensitive data. LSASS writes audit information to the Security event log according to configured policies.

Windows offers two auditing levels: basic auditing with nine categories configured via secpol.msc and advanced auditing with 53 subcategories managed through the auditpol utility. The article focuses on advanced auditing because it allows precise control, for example enabling only Logon and Special Logon without cluttering logs with irrelevant Kerberos or IPsec events on standalone machines.

Key Subcategories and Corresponding Event IDs

The most important subcategories for incident response include:

  • Logon – successful logons (Event ID 4624)
  • Logoff – session termination (Event IDs 4634, 4647)
  • Account Lockout – lockout events (Event ID 4740)
  • Special Logon – privilege escalation via runas (Event ID 4648)
  • User Account Management – account creation and deletion (Event IDs 4720, 4726)
  • Security Group Management – group membership changes (Event IDs 4732, 4728)
  • Process Creation – executable launches (Event ID 4688)
  • Audit Policy Change – modifications to auditing itself (Event ID 4719)
  • Other System Events – log clearing (Event ID 1102)

Each subcategory has a fixed GUID that can be used with auditpol when localized names cause issues.

Enabling Advanced Auditing and Additional Logging

After opening an elevated command prompt on a clean Windows 10 Pro 22H2 virtual machine running under VMware Workstation 17 Pro, the author enables a baseline set of subcategories using multiple auditpol commands. Verification is performed with auditpol /get /category:* to confirm success and failure auditing is active for each item.

PowerShell logging is enabled via registry modification under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging, activating Script Block Logging that records decoded script content in the Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational log (Event IDs 4104 and 4103).

Command-line auditing for process creation events is activated by setting the registry value ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled under HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Audit, ensuring the Command Line field in Event ID 4688 is populated.

Practical Testing of Configured Auditing

Five hands-on tests illustrate the value of the configuration. A successful interactive logon produces Event ID 4624 showing Logon Type 2, account name, workstation name, and the responsible process. Failed logon attempts generate Event ID 4625 with failure reason codes such as 0xC000006A for incorrect password.

Process creation with arguments is demonstrated by running whoami /all, resulting in a detailed Event ID 4688 that includes Creator Process ID, New Process ID, and the full command line. Account creation and administrative group membership changes produce Events 4720 and 4732, revealing subject and target account details along with group names.

The article emphasizes performing all changes on virtual machines to prevent excessive log growth or interference with installed applications on production hosts.

Related articles

Habr•Policy & Regulation

Building the Foundation of Digital Trust: Why Identity Security Remains Undervalued

Identity Security is presented as one of the most underestimated pillars of cybersecurity because granting access involves trusting individuals with sensitive information and systems. The article examines the deep intersection of IT and security functions, the costs of manual access errors, and the need to align business processes with technical controls. It references a 2026 Identity Conf study showing 43.5% of organizations experienced errors in manual rights assignment and 33.5% left access for former employees. Recommendations draw on NIST Human-Centered Cybersecurity concepts, SP 800-53, and Russian FSTEC Order No. 117 to design lifecycle processes covering account provisioning, privilege reviews, and continuous monitoring. Models such as RBAC and ABAC are discussed alongside IGA and IdM solutions to ensure business permissions map correctly to application rights. The piece stresses that successful projects require joint IT and security efforts from the initial survey through pilot and acceptance phases while measuring both risk reduction and operational efficiency.

AntiMalware•Policy & Regulation

VK Files Lawsuit in EU Court Seeking to Overturn Sanctions Imposed in July

Russian internet company VK has submitted a formal challenge to the European Union's sanctions regime by filing a case with the Court of Justice of the European Union. The company argues that the restrictions placed on VK and its subsidiary Communication Platform LLC are both unjustified and unlawful. The lawsuit, registered under case number T-664/26 on 7 October, directly contests the July sanctions that targeted the developer of the MAX messenger. Earlier restrictions had already led to the removal of multiple VK ecosystem applications from Apple App Store and Google Play, forcing users toward alternative distribution channels such as RuStore, Huawei AppGallery, Samsung Galaxy Store and Xiaomi GetApps. While installed Android applications continue to function and receive updates, iOS users face disrupted push notifications after the apps were delisted. The legal action itself does not automatically restore app availability in the affected stores.

Securitylab•Policy & Regulation

VPN Rules in Russia 2026: No Fine for Ordinary Users but Strict Penalties for Advertising and Extremist Content Access

As of September 2026, Russia maintains no separate administrative fine for ordinary citizens simply connecting to a VPN service. Responsibility arises only for specific actions such as deliberately searching for known extremist materials, advertising tools to bypass restrictions, or failing to comply with Roskomnadzor demands as a service operator. Corporate VPNs used for remote access to company networks remain fully legal under exceptions in Article 15.8 of Law No. 149-FZ. New provisions in the Code of Administrative Offenses, including Articles 13.53, 13.52 and 14.3 introduced by Laws 281-FZ and 282-FZ, impose fines ranging from 3,000 to 500,000 rubles depending on the violation and the offender category. The rules distinguish clearly between end users, service owners and advertisers. VPN technology itself is not banned, yet public services face ongoing blocking and operators must integrate with state filtering systems. The material reflects the regulatory situation on 24 September 2026.

Habr•Policy & Regulation

Troubleshooting Erroneous TSPU Blocks: How Admins Can Collaborate with Russian Regulators

A Moneta client outage traced back to erroneous filtering on Russia's TSPU system rather than internal infrastructure or DDoS protection. Engineers used curl, traceroute, nping, and custom Python scripts to confirm TCP payload-based blocking after the handshake. The team submitted a request via the VTS personal account, received partial acceptance status, then escalated to DCOA and SSOP to obtain the specific TSPU site number. Detailed network traces and active traffic were required for diagnostics. The case highlights coordination challenges between operators, DCOA, and SSOP when erroneous blocks occur on information resources.