GitHub and PyPI Introduce Time-Based Defenses Against Supply Chain Attacks
GitHub and PyPI have activated new time-based barriers to slow down supply chain attacks. Dependabot now waits a default of 72 hours before proposing version updates, while PyPI rejects new files added to releases older than 14 days.
The platforms introduced the changes in recent weeks with a shared goal: inserting time delays to reduce the typical damage from supply chain attacks. In Dependabot, the GitHub bot for managing dependencies, the update appears as a default 72-hour wait before opening a pull request when a new package version is released.
In PyPI, the central repository for the Python ecosystem, the platform has rejected uploads of new files since July if the release was published more than 14 days earlier. The Dependabot adjustment does not aim to block urgent patches. The wait applies only to version updates that are not considered security-related. Security updates remain immediate to avoid penalizing critical fixes when risk is already identified.
The objective is to prevent a project from absorbing a freshly published version within minutes that has not yet passed the community’s natural filter, or that an attacker may have inserted after compromising an account or publication workflow. Teams relying on automation will notice the change in cadence. The wait can be adjusted or disabled with the cooldown option in the dependabot.yml file, which is relevant for repositories with strict maintenance windows or their own validation processes. GitHub Enterprise Server will also incorporate the feature, with deployment planned for GHES 3.23.
In PyPI, the 14-day restriction targets a tactic that has caused problems: poisoning of older and stable versions. If an attacker obtains publication tokens or access to a poorly protected CI/CD pipeline, they can attempt to upload a new artifact to a past version with the same number but different content. This complicates audits and breaks basic assumptions in many build environments. The change was integrated on July 8 2026 and was adopted after debate returned to the forefront in March following compromises in projects such as LiteLLM and Telnyx linked to a mutable reference when using the GitHub Action Trivy.
PyPI acknowledges that the ecosystem still lacks standardized semantics and APIs to declare whether a release is open or closed. The platform anticipates progress through initiatives such as Upload 2.0 API and Staged Previews, which should enable more secure workflows without relying solely on rigid rules.
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GitHub and PyPI Add Time-Based Defenses Against Supply Chain Attacks
GitHub and PyPI have introduced new time-based barriers to slow down supply chain attacks. Dependabot now waits a default of 72 hours before proposing version updates, while PyPI rejects new files added to releases older than 14 days. The changes target non-security version updates and attempts to poison older stable releases. Security updates remain immediate, and the cooldown can be adjusted via dependabot.yml. PyPI's restriction addresses risks from compromised tokens or CI/CD pipelines that allow malicious artifacts on past versions. The measures were implemented in July 2026 following incidents involving projects like LiteLLM and Telnyx.
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